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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The relative importance of management policies and actions and 
uncontrolled market factors in determining commercial bank performance 
is not well-documented, particularly for agricultural banks.^  A bank's 
performance may be influenced by a number of factors including the 
bank's "asset and liability portfolio management, its management's 
control over operations costs, its size, the concentrations in its local 
market, its local market conditions and its luck" (Wall, 1983b). 
This study is an attempt to shed more light on the relationships 
among management policies and actions, uncontrolled market factors, and 
agricultural bank performance. Such a study is warranted in an 
environment where there is potential for increased competition from both 
bank and nonbank institutions (Barry, 1983; Garcia, 1981). Owners and 
managers of agricultural banks are uncertain as to how best to respond 
to recent financial legislation that will impact competitive 
relationships. To this point, discussions of the matter appear to have 
been based upon the assumption that uncontrolled market factors, 
particularly competition from depository and nondepository 
intermediaries, will determine the future success of agricultural banks 
(Barry, 1980, 1981, 1983; Partee, 1980; Smith, 1980; Jackson, 1980; 
Moore, 1980). A number of relatively recent studies indicate otherwise 
(Ford, 1974, 1978; Ford and Olson, 1976, 1978; Olson, 1975; Wall, 
A^gricultural banks are defined here as commercial banks whose loan 
portfolios consist of at least 25 percent agricultural loans. 
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1983b). Empirically, the issue has not been addressed satisfactorily. 
The first section of this chapter consists of a review of the 
concerns of agricultural bankers in light of recent financial 
deregulation. The second part of the chapter addresses the need to 
measure the relative importance of management factors and market factors 
before prescribing future courses of action for agricultural banks. The 
third and final section summarizes the objective of this study and 
previews the procedures to be used. 
Financial Deregulation and Competition 
Recently, there has been increased concern about the ability of 
agricultural banks to maintain their competitive position in the 
agricultural production credit market in the face of new financial 
legislation (Barry, 1980, 1981, 1983; Partee, 1980). Many believe that 
the problems that plagued agricultural banks during the 1970s—periods 
of low liquidity, limited sources of loanable funds, and low legal 
lending limits—may seriously erode the lending capabilities of these 
institutions when combined with the effects of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) and the 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (DIA). In 
particular, some agricultural bankers are concerned about their ability 
to compete directly with Production Credit Associations (PCAs) in the 
loan market while competition for deposit funds from other depository 
institutions increases as a result of the MCA and DIA. That concern 
stems from the belief that PCAs maintain certain competitive advantages 
over commercial banks because of regulatory and structural differences 
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(Smith, 1980; Jackson, 1980; Moore, 1980) (see also Webb, 1981; 
Benjamin, 1981). 
Impacts of deregulation on bank-nonbank competition 
The three major goals of the MCA are to improve monetary control, 
remove impediments to competition for deposits by depository 
institutions, and make financial services more widely available to the 
public by reducing competitive inequalities among financial institutions 
(Brewer, Gittings, Gonczy, Merris, et al., 1980). Two of the major 
features of the Act are the phasing out of interest rate ceilings by 
March 31, 1986 and the authorization for all depository institutions to 
offer interest-bearing checking accounts. The DIA was designed 
primarily as a rescue operation for savings and loans and mutual savings 
banks, but it also provided for further deregulation of the financial 
system (Garcia, Baer, Brewer, Allardice, et al., 1983). For 
agricultural banks, the direct implication of the Acts is increased 
competition from nonbank financial institutions. 
Title III of the MCA authorizes all depository institutions to 
offer interest-bearing checking accounts or NOW accounts. Title III of 
the DIA authorizes money market deposit accounts at all depository 
institutions. Prior to implementation of nationwide NOW accounts on 
December 31, 1980, commercial banks were the only depository 
institutions that held unquestioned legal authority to offer checkable 
transactions deposits. With the expansion of that authority to nonbank 
depository institutions, competition for transactions deposits will 
likely increase. 
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Competition from nonbank institutions for checkable deposits is 
likely to further reduce the adequacy of local deposits for meeting 
customer loan demand at rural agricultural banks. While regional and 
national money market banks can generally purchase liabilities as 
cheaply as they can obtain local deposits, most agricultural banks find 
money markets inaccessible because of their small size. In addition, 
increased competition for checkable deposits should push interest rates 
on these deposits upward. The loss of deposit shares by commercial 
banks is not new, however, and the impact of deregulation may be to 
speed up a trend that has negative implications for agricultural banks. 
Barry (1981) points out that banks' share of deposits — both demand and 
time deposits — decreased from roughly 80 percent in 1950 to less than 
60 percent in 1980. 
The MCA and DIA provide the potential for increased competition for 
banks from nonbank depository institutions in the loan market as well as 
in the deposit market. Title IV of the MCA and Title III of the DIA 
give expanded asset power to thrift institutions in order to allow 
greater asset diversification and better alignment of asset and 
liability maturities. Specifically, the DIA allows savings and loans to 
invest up to 55 percent of their assets in commercial loans and up to 30 
percent of their assets in consumer loans. In the consumer and 
commercial loan markets, bank-bank competition will be combined with 
some, as yet, undetermined degree of bank-thrift competition. 
Garcia (1981) outlined four possible future trends of agricultural 
credit that could result from financial deregulation. The first 
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possible trend is continued rapid growth of thrifts relative to 
commercial banks. A second possible trend is reduced importance for 
government lenders in the agricultural credit market because of a desire 
to reduce the role of the Federal Government in the free market system. 
A third possible trend is the demise of small agricultural banks because 
of costlier funds and the inability of these banks to raise rates on 
agricultural loans because of PCA competition. A fourth and final 
possible trend is the continued growth of the Farm Credit System. 
Garcia's conclusions indicate that both thrifts and PCAs may gain 
market share at the expense of agricultural banks as a result of 
financial deregulation. Increased bank-thrift competition was discussed 
above. Possible explanations for the growth of PCAs relative to 
agricultural banks is the subject of the next section. 
Competitive advantages of PCAs 
In a study of the competitive impacts of PCAs on agricultural bank 
performance, Webb (1981) discussed alleged structural and regulatory 
advantages of PCAs over banks. First, most of the banks that fund 
agriculture are relatively small rural banks that depend on the local 
deposit market for their loanable funds. These banks are limited in 
their ability to tap the national money market for funds basically 
because of their size and consequent lack of bidding power. When local 
deposit volume declines because of reduced farm income, smaller 
agricultural banks are required to ration credit or turn down loan 
requests. PCAs, on the other hand, are able to obtain funds from the 
national money market through the sale of consolidated bonds or discount 
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notes. PCAs are, therefore, able to supply funds during periods when 
local banks are realizing liquidity problems (for a similar viewpoint on 
this matter, see Benjamin, 1981). 
Secondly, agricultural banks have been finding it more difficult to 
fund larger farmers because of legal lending limits (see also Barry, 
1980; Benjamin, 1980). Legal lending limits are established according 
to the volume of a bank's capital stock and surplus and typically range 
from 10 to 30 percent depending on the purpose of the loan and the 
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chartering agency. In recent years, the growth of debt requirements 
per customer has exceeded the growth of agricultural banks' eligible 
capital accounts in general. For PCAs, lending limits are 50 percent of 
capital and surplus, and in certain situations, the lending limit can be 
increased to 100 percent of capital and surplus. PCAs have apparently 
had little problem meeting the debt needs of larger borrowers whereas 
Benjamin found that many midwestern agricultural banks were finding it 
increasingly difficult to meet the needs of their largest customers. 
Another area in which commercial banks and PCAs differ relates to 
regulations on reserve requirements. Commercial banks are required by 
law to hold a certain proportion of their assets in the form of 
nonincome earning balances at Federal Reserve Banks — either directly 
or as "pass through" balances — or as vault cash. The proportion of 
assets held as required reserves by a particular bank depends on that 
bank's deposit mix and deposit volume. PCAs, unlike commercial banks, 
2 The Garn-St. Germain Act raised the lower limit from 10 to 15 
percent of capital and surplus for national banks. 
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are not depository institutions and, therefore, are not required to hold 
nonincome earning assets in their portfolios. 
Finally, PCAs would appear to have an advantage in terms of tax 
liabilities. Because PCAs are cooperatives, they are legally able to 
reduce their tax liabilities by issuing patronage refunds. The end 
results of issuing refunds are a partial shift of tax incidence toward 
member borrowers and away from PCAs, and an increased ability to 
increase equity capital. Commercial banks, on the other hand, are taxed 
as noncooperative corporations. Although PCAs may not compete directly 
with commercial banks for equity capital, the inability of small banks 
to raise significant new equity capital combined with the tax treatment 
of PCAs creates the potential for a widening legal lending limit gap. 
In addition to the differences between banks and PCAs as discussed 
by Webb, the Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980 will have an impact on 
bank-PCA competition. The most important part of the legislation for 
agricultural banks was the extension of PCA lending authority to 
agribusinesses, an area in which commercial banks had limited 
competition from nongovernment lenders prior to passage of the 1980 
3 
amendments. 
3 Because PCAs are not depository institutions, and because PCA 
assets are essentially restricted to loans, these lenders face unique 
problems relative to agricultural banks. PCA loan rates are based upon 
rates paid on Farm Credit System notes and bonds, therefore, PCA loan 
rates tend to lag behind bank rates. In addition, PCA asset portfolios 
are more specialized than asset portfolios of most agricultural banks. 
Because of existing differences between PCAs and banks, the impact of 
PCA competition on agricultural banks tends to be cyclical as indicated 
by problems faced by PCAs in the mid-1980s. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The combined effects of financial deregulation and bank-PCA 
competition could have strong implications for the future level of 
competition in the farm production credit market. As of December 31, 
1980, commercial banks with less than 25 million dollars in assets 
controlled only 6.2 percent of all bank assets but held nearly 1/3 of 
all farm production loans outstanding at banks (see Severn and Nevin, 
1981). If banks in this size category find it increasingly difficult to 
supply production credit because of the issues discussed above, there 
could be a substantial shift in providers of credit. 
On the other hand, by focusing attention only on market structure, 
bankers may be overlooking a factor that could significantly influence 
future competitiveness. While the concerns discussed above are 
certainly not without merit, the situation may warrant addressing a more 
inclusive issue, namely the relationships among management policies and 
actions, uncontrolled market factors, and bank performance. Despite an 
abundance of research in the past, those relationships are still 
relatively obscure, particularly for nonurban banks. If the 
relationship between market structure and bank performance has been 
overstated, and the relationship between management policy and bank 
performance has been understated, agricultural bankers may be taking a 
too narrow view of the deregulation-competition issue. In other words, 
if the management factor is more important than the structural factor in 
determining bank performance, it may be in the interest of bank owners 
to respond to potentially greater competition by improving management. 
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Exploratory research conducted jointly by staff members at the 
American Bankers Association, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and Carter Golembe Associates (Ford, 1974, 1978; Ford and Olson, 1976, 
1978; Olson, 1975) indicated that management was an important 
determinant of bank performance where bank performance was measured by 
retum-on-equity. The researchers concluded from the series of studies 
that some banks were more profitable because management had greater 
success at generating revenues and controlling expenses at those banks. 
Furthermore, expense control appeared to be the single most important 
determinant of profitability. These studies failed, however, to 
adequately account for the role of local market structure because most 
structural information was aggregated to the state level (see Ford and 
Olson, 1978). 
Failure to control more precisely for market concentration in 
these studies might have been a serious shortcoming in light of 
secondary research findings. Manipulations of balance sheet and income 
statement data by the researchers revealed certain regularities over 
time among balance sheet ratios and rates of return. Most notably, loan 
to total asset ratios were lower at high profit banks than at other 
banks while loan yields were higher. Also, time and savings deposit to 
total deposit ratios were lower at high profit banks than at other 
banks. These phenomena could be consistent with greater monopoly power 
at high profit banks. In fact, Milkove and Weisblat (1982) found that 
lower loan to deposit ratios and lower time and savings deposit to total 
deposit ratios were associated with lower levels of competition, at 
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4 least for a sample of nomnetropolitan banks. 
In apparent response to the shortcomings of the FDIC-ABA research. 
Wall (1983b) controlled for market concentration in his study of bank 
profitability. Wall reached a conclusion similar to that of the FDIC-
ABA. researchers, that high profits result from superior management. 
Market concentration apparently was not a major factor. However, Wall 
used only bank deposits to construct measures of concentration, whereas 
Milkove and Weisblat utilized the assets of savings and loans and credit 
unions as well as banks. More importantly. Wall might have found little 
relationship between bank performance and market structure because of a 
specification error in his regression model, a topic to be addressed 
later. 
Most related research has focused on the relationship between market 
structure and performance while ignoring the role of management (most 
notably because this research has been designed for policy analysis 
purposes and not to determine the role of management policy in bank 
performance). The findings of this rather extensive body of research 
have been mixed regarding the effects of market structure on bank 
performance (see for example Rhoades, 1977, 1982). Most studies have 
found statistically significant relationships,^  but the strengths of 
A lower loan to asset ratio does not necessarily imply a lower 
loan to deposit ratio. However, if deposit-capital structure is 
similar among banks, the ratios could be expected to vary directly. 
O^sborne and Wendel (1983) take a much more negative view of this 
body of research and state that "the results do not, in the large, 
indicate a statistically significant concentration effect even when 
taken at their reported face value." 
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relationships have been variable. 
It appears, then, that agricultural bankers could benefit from new 
information regarding the relationships among market structure, 
management policies and actions, and bank performance where market 
structure and management policies and actions are analyzed 
simultaneously. Such an analysis may provide a clue as to how bankers 
should respond to changes in the farm credit market which could result 
from financial deregulation. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide information about the joint 
effects of market structure, other uncontrolled market factors, and 
management policies and actions on agricultural bank performance. This 
information is generated by regressing bank performance variables on 
structural and other market variables in both single equation and 
multiple equation empirical models. The study is unique in that a 
theoretically derived measure of bank management is included as an 
exogenous variable in the models. Previous structure-performance 
studies which failed to account for the role of management in bank 
performance might have suffered from serious estimation problems. If a 
relevant explanatory variable is excluded from a regression model, the 
estimator of variances of slope coefficients contains an upward bias. 
In addition, the estimator of the coefficients themselves may be biased 
(Kmenta, 1971). 
Specifically, the analytical procedure is used to test the 
hypothesis that when additional information about management is made 
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available, the importance of market structure as a determinant of bank 
performance is reduced. Rejection of this hypothesis will justify 
agricultural bankers' concerns about the potential effects of financial 
deregulation. 
Overview of study 
The subjects of this study are a group of Iowa agricultural banks. 
The analysis is limited to a single state in order to provide a detailed 
analysis of local banking markets while eliminating the effects of state 
banking regulations on bank performance. 
Performance variables used in the analysis as dependent variables 
are the loan to total asset ratio and the time and savings deposit to 
total deposit ratio. These variables were chosen to reflect bank 
performance because 1) they are not heavily influenced by accounting 
procedures, 2) they theoretically reflect optimization decisions made by 
bank management, and 3) they have been found to exhibit consistent 
relationships with bank profitability (Ford, 1974, 1978; Ford and Olson, 
1976, 1978; Olson, 1975; Wall, 1983b). 
Profitability is not used as a measure of bank performance in this 
study because as Wall (1983b) points out, small banks tend to be manager 
owned and owner-managers can remunerate themselves through various 
combinations of salary and dividends. Equal economic profit does not 
necessarily indicate equal accounting profit. While agricultural banks 
can vary widely in terms of size, small banks dominate in terms of 
numbers. 
Rates received and paid were also excluded from consideration as 
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measures of bank performance for two reasons. First, data on actual 
loan rates charged and deposit rates paid at a large number of 
agricultural banks are not easily obtained. Call report and income 
report data are not likely to provide desirable substitutes for those 
items, either, because of the seasonality of business at agricultural 
banks. Estimated rates can only be obtained by dividing flows from 
income statements by average stocks from call reports. Stock figures 
from call reports may not be representative of the true stocks which 
created the flows on corresponding income statements. Secondly, studies 
of market structure have generally revealed weak relationships or 
statistically insignificant relationships between rates and market 
structure, hypothetically because banks are nonprice competitors. (See 
Brown 1983 for additional criticisms of using financial ratios as 
prices.) 
Independent variables used in the regression analysis include 
factors that theoretically affect bank performance. Included variables 
are a Herfindahl index and a market share variable to proxy the level of 
competition in local banking markets; a size variable to control for 
possible economies of scale; a retail sale variable to reflect local 
economic conditions; and a management ability variable to represent 
management's impact on bank performance. 
Herfindahl indices are calculated using time and savings deposits 
of commercial banks, savings and loans, and credit unions within local 
banking markets. Local banking markets are equivalent to banking 
markets delineated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Allardice, 
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1982) to analyze the competitive impacts of holding company acquisitions 
or formations. 
There is currently little conclusive evidence for or against the 
existence of significant economies of scale in banking (Benston, 
Hanweck, and Humphrey, 1982). However, ABA-FDIC research (Ford, 1974) 
revealed that the most profitable banks consisted of a 
disproportionately large number of medium size banks ($10-100 million of 
deposits) and disproportionately small numbers of small (< §10 million 
of deposits) and large (> $100 million of deposits) banks. Given the 
dearth of conclusive empirical evidence against economies of scale in 
banking, it was deemed appropriate to include a size variable in the 
statistical model. 
The retail sale variable is included because changes in the level 
of economic activity can affect the intercept parameters of asset demand 
and deposit supply functions in the local market. For example, 
relatively high retail sales growth may increase the demand for loans 
relative to other assets and increase the supply of time and savings 
deposits relative to other deposits. The specific variable used is 
percentage change in county retail sales. 
Bank management ability is approximated by the ratio of assets to 
employees at individual banks. This measure is consistent with 
theoretical models explaining observed relationships among management 
compensation, firm size, and firm structure. 
The empirical analysis consists of cross-sectional studies for two 
separate years, 1976 and 1978. Two years are used in order to 
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determine the stability of relationships over time. Pre-DIDMCA data are 
used in order to eliminate any dynamic effects of deregulation on bank 
performance (in a recent study, Rhoades (1984) used pre-DIDMCA data for 
the same reason). 
Statement of objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to determine the relationships 
among market structure, management policies and actions, and 
agricultural bank performance in the state of Iowa by testing the 
hypothesis that when additional information about management is made 
available, the importance of market structure as a determinant of bank 
performance is reduced. Secondary objectives are as follows: 
1. provide a basis for the study of agricultural credit markets 
in other states, 
2. utilize an empirical procedure which may be relevant to the 
interpretation of future structure-performance studies, 
particularly those pertaining to bank regulation. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The literature pertaining to bank performance falls into three 
fairly distinct but not unrelated categories. One of those categories 
involves determining relationships between market structure and bank 
performance with little or no reference to bank management. That group 
of studies can be classified as the structure-performance literature. 
A second literature category relates to the effects of market 
structure on bank management's decision-making process and generally 
tests either the Galbraith-Caves ("quiet-life") hypothesis or the 
expense-preference hypothesis. Both hypotheses state that management's 
decision-making process is based on utility maximization rather than 
profit maximization. Specifically, the Galbraith-Caves hypothesis 
implies that bank managers in highly concentrated markets will trade 
excess profits for lower levels of risk. The expense-preference 
hypothesis implies that bank managers in highly concentrated markets 
will reduce potential monopoly profits by increasing expenditures on 
those items which have a positive influence on management's utility 
(Edwards (1977) proposes high management salaries, hiring excessive 
staff, and lax personnel supervision; Hannan and Mavinga (1980) 
similarly discuss excessive bank employees and high wage and salary 
expenditures). 
Tests of the former hypothesis generally involve estimating 
relationships between market structure and measures of risk including 
the variability of profits. Tests of the latter hypothesis generally 
involve estimating relationships between market structure and certain 
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expense categories preferred by management. The literature pertaining 
to both hypotheses shall be referred to as the structure-utility 
literature. 
A third group of studies involves attempts to relate the quality of 
bank management to bank performance or simply to explain successful bank 
performance. The approach taken in most of those studies is to isolate 
balance sheet or income statement items that are common to high profit 
banks. If such items are intuitively influenced by management, they are 
considered keys to the improvement of bank performance. This 
management-performance literature is seldom based on theoretical models 
and generally does not account for market structure. 
In the past, no one has effectively combined and taken advantage of 
the information provided by the three bodies of literature. As a 
result, both the management-performance studies and the structure-
performance studies have provided questionable results. In order to 
properly test the hypothesis introduced in Chapter I, it is necessary to 
review the strengths and weaknesses of past bank performance studies. 
Management-Performance 
The discussion of the management-performance literature is brief 
because both the methodology and the conclusions are highly homogeneous. 
Methodologically, the management-performance studies require little more 
than calculation and comparison of financial ratios or regressing 
measures of bank profitability (ROA, EDE) on financial ratios. 
Numerical results generally indicate that expenses, especially non-
interest expenses, tend to be lower at high profit banks, which implies 
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that those banks have superior management. It is sufficient to note 
here that the management-performance literature may be deficient because 
it fails to control for differences in market structure.^  
Structure-Performance 
Rhoades (1977,1982) has conveniently summarized the results of 65 
structure-performance studies conducted between 1960 and 1982.^  A 
majority of those studies - 53 of 65 - revealed a statistically 
significant relationship in the direction suggested by economic theory 
between market structure and at least one measure of bank performance. 
In general, the results of the studies would appear to support the 
hypothesis that "markets with a highly concentrated structure will 
exhibit profits and prices that are higher than those in less 
concentrated markets." Rhoades cautions, however, that structure's 
influence on performance tends to be quantitatively small. 
There are others who are not willing to accept the empirical results 
of past structure-performance studies as strong evidence favoring the 
The FDIC-ABA studies referred to in Chapter I fall into this 
category. Other management-performance studies are those by Fraser 
(1976), Gady (1972), Haslem (1968,1969), Kohers and Simpson (1978), and 
Kwast and Rose (1981). Kwast and Rose do state in a footnote that 
average Herfindahl indices did not differ significantly between groups 
of high profit and low profit banks. 
H^eggestad (1979) compiled a summary of 44 structure-performance 
studies that appeared between 1961 and 1977. With a few exceptions, 
Heggestad's work covers the same studies that were included in Rhoades' 
1977 summary. 
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structure-performance hypothesis. Osborne and Wendel (1983) conclude 
that "contrary to widespread belief, the weight of the evidence is 
against the concentration-conduct hypothesis." After critically 
reviewing surveys of structure-performance studies compiled by Benston 
(1973), Osborne (1977), and Rhoades (1977), Osborne and Wendel stated 
that, "careful examination of the published articles and the widely-
circulated working papers will show that less than half of the publicly 
reported searches have succeeded." If all empirical results were made 
public, the proportion of studies revealing a significant relationship 
between market structure and bank performance would likely be reduced 
further. 
Osborne and Wendel pointed out a number of shortcomings of the 
structure-performance literature in general. Included were a) failure 
to properly account for nonbank competition, b) homogeneity of 
empirical methodology which generally is not based on explicit 
optimization models, and c) the practice of utilizing geographically 
delineated banking markets. Since these issues are relevant to the 
hypothesis being tested in this study, each will be addressed in turn. 
Nonbank competition 
Of the 56 studies reviewed by Rhoades, 26 had accounted for nonbank 
competition. However, nine studies had measured nonbank competition 
qualitatively, six had used numbers of competitors, nine had utilized 
market shares or a related measure, and only two had used a traditional 
measure of market structure (concentration ratio or Herfindahl index). 
As noted in the previous chapter, Milkove and Weisblat (1982) had 
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incorporated savings and loan and credit union assets into their 
Herfindahl index. They consequently found that higher levels of 
concentration were significantly related to lower loan to deposit ratios 
and lower time and savings deposit to total deposit ratios. Scott 
(1977) utilized savings banks and commercial banks from the First, 
Second, and Third Federal Reserve Districts to compute three-bank 
concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices. The three-bank 
concentration ratio was found to have a significant positive influence 
on small business loan rates in only one equation out of six estimated, 
and the Herfindahl index was not found to be significant in any of the 
equations» These results are in contrast to findings obtained when 
commercial banks only were used to measure concentration. In the latter 
case, the Herfindahl index was significant in all equations in which it 
was included, and the three-bank concentration ratio was significant in 
all equations but one. 
Although Osborne and Wendel were critical of qualitative 
representation of nonbank competitors (dummy variables in regression 
equations), there was surprisingly little difference in success between 
methods. Of the nine studies that did utilize qualitative variables, 
five revealed a statistically significant relationship between nonbank 
competition and performance. On the other hand, only four of nine 
studies that used a market share or related measure revealed significant 
relationships. Of the five studies that used numbers of competitors 
(one study did not specify results), three reported statistical 
significance, and as noted above, only one of the two studies that 
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utilized a concentration ratio or Herfindahl index found statistically 
significant relationships. 
In a study completed subsequent to Rhoades' summaries and Osborne 
and Wendel's article, Hannan (1984) used Herfindahl indices to account 
for competition among commercial banks, savings and loan associations, 
mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Utilizing a sample of 412 
Pennsylvania banks, Hannan found that passbook savings rates paid were 
lower in more concentrated markets. Banking hours were also found to be 
significantly reduced in more concentrated markets. The empirical 
results suggested that bank performance is significantly influenced by 
competition from savings and loan associations but not mutual savings 
banks or credit unions. 
Curry and Rose (1984) criticized an earlier study by Marlow (1982) 
because he had not accounted for competition from nonbank intermediaries 
when measuring the effects of concentration of mortgage lending rates. 
The authors computed concentration ratios for banks, mutual savings 
banks, and savings and loan associations in 113 SMSAs surveyed by Marlow 
and found "a modest improvement by measuring market concentration in 
terms of all mortgage lending depository institutions." 
Homogeneity of methodology 
A review of procedures used in past structure-performance studies 
reveals a high degree of uniformity given the questionable success of 
those studies. Of the 65 studies reviewed by Rhoades, 56 utilized 
multiple regression or a variation of multiple regression. In addition, 
two studies involved the use of three-stage least squares or a 
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combination of three-stage least squares and ordinary least squares. Of 
the remaining studies, four used graphical or tabular analysis, one used 
switching regression, one utilized tobit analysis, and one relied upon 
factor analysis. 
As indicated by the numbers, regression analysis, particularly 
ordinary least squares regression analysis, has been the dominant 
procedure used to test the structure-performance hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, most of the previous studies failed to recognize the 
possibility that error terms of ordinary least squares regression 
equations may not satisfy the basic assumptions of the classical normal 
linear regression model (see Kmenta, 1971, Chapter 7). The problem is 
especially acute for studies that measure performance at the firm level 
rather than the market level, and it results from failure to base 
empirical models on complete theoretical models of the banking firm. 
Very few studies have accounted for differences in management between 
banks even though it is widely accepted that management does indeed 
influence bank performance. Error terms hypothetically contain the 
excluded management variable, hence, tests of hypotheses about 
regression coefficients may not be valid if an ordinary least squares 
estimator is used. 
No structure-performance studies appear to have included a complete 
measure of bank management as an explanatory variable. Several studies 
have included variables to control for differences in costs among banks, 
and costs are logically influenced by management. However, costs can be 
influenced by factors beyond management's control. Three studies 
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included variables that reflected differences among managers but those 
variables reflected mainly differences in risk aversion and not 
g 
management ability per se. 
Although solutions for the excluded management variable problem 
were not provided, two studies did recognize the possibility that error 
terms of ordinary least squares regression equations may not satisfy 
classical assumptions. Scott, in the study cited in the previous 
section, recognized the possibility that the error terms in a pooled 
cross-sectional time series analysis of bank performance may be 
heteroskedastic as well as autocorrelated (although he did not 
explicitly link the error terms to an excluded management variable). 
Using alternative specifications, Scott estimated equations to explain 
differences in small business loan rates at 80 banks. Ordinary least 
squares analysis provided results which were consistent with theory — 
bank concentration and loan rates were directly related — and 
qualitatively the same as results produced by a cross-sectionally 
9 heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive specification. 
White (1984) hypothesized a variance-components structure for the 
error term of the estimated relationship between return on assets and a 
number of independent variables including the three-bank concentration 
g 
Vernon (1971) found no significant difference in profitability 
between owner-controlled and manager—controlled banks while Classman and 
Rhoades (1980) did find a significant effect. Rhoades (1981) failed to 
find consistently significant relationships between portfolio risk 
(loans to assets) and various measures of bank performance. 
9 It should be noted that this particular comparison was based on a 
sample of 13 banks. 
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ratio. The assumption that error terms were uncorrelated among firms, 
including firms in the same market, appeared too strong when market 
variables entered firm specific equations. 
Utilizing 4311 banks from 927 single county markets in unit banking 
states. White estimated firm specific equations with both ordinary least 
squares and generalized least squares. She found that estimated 
coefficients were similar between procedures, but that levels of 
significance were higher for ordinary least squares estimation. White 
concluded that hypothesis "testing in firm specifications using ordinary 
least squares may thus be too optimistic." White's empirical results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that management characteristics are 
reflected in the error terms of ordinary least squares equations. 
Failure to include a management variable in past structure-
performance studies of banking appears to have been justified in some 
cases, for example when banking data were aggregated within markets (but 
even this excuse may not be totally legitimate according to research 
still to be reviewed). In most cases, however, exclusion of a 
management variable can be attributed to poor modeling on the behalf of 
the researcher, or more likely, inability to successfully quantify 
management. Bryan's (1972) study reveals the difficulties associated 
with reducing bank management to a set of numbers. 
Using bank financial data and detailed information about bank 
management, Bryan attempted to identify key management characteristics 
and practices at successful banks. Bryan began his analysis by 
intuitively selecting explanatory variables that appeared to affect bank 
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performance but were beyond the control of management. These variables 
were used to predict profitability at approximately 1200 medium-sized 
banks ($10 million ^  deposits ^  §25 million). Subsequently, predicted 
profits were compared with actual profits in order to isolate 
"successful" and "laggardly" banks. The upper 10% of banks whose 
predicted profits were high relative to their actual profits were termed 
successful, while the lower 10% of banks whose predicted profits were 
low relative to their actual profits were termed laggardly. 
To isolate characteristics of management as well as management 
behavior at successful banks, Bryan utilized information from a 28 item 
questionnaire that had been completed by bank personnel. Information 
pertaining to management at successful banks was compared with 
information pertaining to management at laggardly banks through the use 
of tests of association. 
Bryan found very few characteristics that differentiated management 
at successful banks from management at laggardly banks. The two items 
that did prove to be significantly different between groups were the 
importance of "in-house" directors and officer attendance of American 
Institute of Banking (AIB) courses. Successful banks were more likely 
to have directors who were also officers, and the percentage of officers 
who had attended AIB courses was higher at successful banks. Those 
items that did not prove to be significantly different were: a) 
percentage of officers who were also owners, b) age of directors, c) 
number of directors, d) age of officers, e) number of years of banking 
e:q)erience of officers, f) high school attendance, g) college 
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attendance, h) graduate school attendance, i) school of banking 
attendance, j) president's salary, k) officers' salaries,and 1) 
aggressiveness of management as perceived by management. 
Regarding management practices, Bryan found that only tax strategy 
differentiated successful banks from laggardly banks. Successful banks 
were more likely to plan capital gains and losses and hold the maximum 
allowable reserve for bad debts. Items that were not significantly 
different between groups were: a) advertising and public relations 
activities, b) formal planning effort, c) asset management 
(correspondent review of bond portfolio, participation with other banks 
in large loans, use of the federal funds market), d) computer usage, and 
e) advertising expenditures. 
Bryan concluded his study by analyzing banks according to their 
actual profitability (net earnings and after-tax income) rather than 
deviations from profitability in order to "get some feel for the impact 
of the selection process on our choice of 'successful' banks ...." When 
banks were ranked according to net earnings, only one management 
characteristic/practice was significantly different between groups, 
that being tax strategy. Alternatively, when banks were ranked 
according to after-tax income, several items differentiated profitable 
banks from less profitable banks. Significant characteristics and 
It is interesting to note that financial statement data revealed 
significant differences between groups for two related items. The 
ratio of officers' wages to total assets was significantly lower at 
successful banks, while the ratio of employee benefits to total assets 
was significantly higher at successful banks. 
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practices of management at profitable banks were: a) older directors, 
b) more experienced officers, c) fewer advertising and public relations 
activities, d) less formal planning, e) less computer usage, f) smaller 
advertising expenditures, and finally g) better tax strategy. 
In summary, a review of structure-performance literature reveals 
that management's impact on bank performance is accounted for very 
infrequently. Results of a study by Bryan indicate that management is 
difficult to quantify, partly because management affects different 
measures of performance differently, and this may partially explain 
previous failures to include management variables in empirical models. 
The potential damage from excluding management variables may be revealed 
by White's study, which indicated that ordinary least squares estimation 
may be deficient under such circumstances. 
Geographical delineation of banking markets 
As alluded to earlier, Osborne and Wendel (1983) believe that past 
structure-performance studies are faulty because they rely on the 
concept of a geographically delineated banking market. Essentially, 
they are critical of the idea that a market determines bank behavior, 
and that all banks within a market consequently respond in the same way 
to the actions of a competitor. Osborne and Wendel propose that bank 
behavior determines markets, rather than vice versa, and that 
concentration is a product of competition rather than a vehicle for 
collusion. In other words, some markets may be more concentrated simply 
because one firm is more successful than its competitors. 
Rhoades (1984), in contrast to Osborne and Wendel, places the blame 
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for less than convincing results in structure-performance studies on 
incomplete utilization of market information rather than improper 
delineation of markets per se. Rhoades discounts the idea that firm 
efficiency (economies of scale) determines the structure of markets and 
embraces the notion that differences in firm performance can be 
explained by differences in market share. The firm that controls the 
largest share of the market, i.e., the largest firm, is postulated to 
benefit from "inherent product differentiation." Inherent product 
differentiation arises from a psychologically-based perception among 
customers that the largest firm's products are in some way superior. 
Utilizing a sample of 6492 unit banks, Rhoades tested the 
hypothesis that bank performance is significantly influenced by market 
share. The banks were grouped into deciles according to the value of 
the three-bank concentration ratio in each bank's market (counties and 
SMSAs apparently served as markets). Within each decile, return on 
assets (annual average net income after taxes and securities gains and 
losses divided by total assets) was regressed on firm market share 
(annual average percentage of market deposits held by firm) and eight 
other firm specific variables. The statistical results generally 
supported the hypothesis that bank performance is affected by market 
share; the market share coefficient was significant and positive in six 
out of seven decile equations as well as in an equation representing all 
6492 banks. Rhoades concluded that market share creates market power 
regardless of the level of concentration in the market. 
By allowing each bank to have a different market share, Rhoades 
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overcame Osborne and Wendel's criticism that all firms in a single 
market cannot conceivably respond to competitive pressure in the same 
way. Nevertheless, his methodology does not quell the dispute over the 
direction of causality between firm actions and concentration, Rhoades 
concluded that his empirical results eliminated differences in 
efficiency (economies of scale) as an explanation of performance 
differences among banks because an included firm size variable was not 
consistently significant in eight estimated equations. However, 
tabulated information indicates that there may be a direct relationship 
between firm size and market share which could confound the empirical 
relationships among bank performance, firm size, and market share. In 
addition, Rhoades* empirical results do not explain how the firm with the 
largest share of the market attained its status. In spite of Rhoades' 
empirical findings, it is still a possibility that the largest firm in 
each market is also the most efficient firm in the market due to 
superior management.^  ^
In an industry such as banking, where markets are spatial in nature 
and entry is regulated, it is conceivable that the number of firms is 
exogenous to the market but the level of concentration is not. Of 
course, regardless of whether market concentration is exogenous or 
endogenous, empirical modeling still requires delineation of a 
geographic "market." How that should be accomplished remains to be 
revealed (see Allardice (1982) for a review of 24 market delineation 
^^ Rhoades notes in his paper that an unidentified referee suggested 
the possibility that high market shares result from high profits. 
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articles). 
12 Structure-Utility 
The structure-utility literature is important to banking because, 
on the surface at least, it provides results that are consistent with 
empirical observations of banks. For example, both the Galbraith-Caves 
and expense-preference hypotheses provide explanations for the observed 
weak relationships between market concentration and bank profitability. 
The Galbraith-Caves hypothesis implies that potential monopoly profits 
are traded for lower levels of risk while the expense-preference 
hypothesis implies that potential monopoly profits are reduced through 
excessive expenditures. 
The expense-preference hypothesis says very little about portfolio 
structure, but the Galbraith-Caves hypothesis implies that portfolios at 
monopoly banks should be relatively low in risk. If loans are assumed 
to be relatively high risk assets, then the hypothesis is consistent 
with Milkove and Weisblat's (1982) observation that banks in highly 
concentrated markets tend to have lower loan to deposit ratios. Milkove 
and Weisblat also observed lower demand deposit to total deposit ratios 
at banks in more highly concentrated markets, but the link between risk 
attitude of management and liability mix is not as clear as the link 
12 The structure-utility studies reviewed in this section can be 
found in Rhoades' summaries because they included estimation of 
relationships between market structure and at least one measure of bank 
performance. 
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between risk attitude and asset mix.^  ^
Galbralth-Caves hypothesis 
Edwards and Heggestad (1973) were the first to apply the Galbraith-
Caves hypothesis to banking. The variability of profits for 66 large 
metropolitan banks was regressed on the three-firm concentration ratio 
for SMSAs as well as variables representing bank size, geographic 
diversification, and variability of demand for bank services. The 
empirical results revealed that the coefficient on the concentration 
variable was negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
increased concentration was associated with reduced variability of 
profits. The results, therefore, were consistent with the Galbraith-
Caves hypothesis. The authors concluded that: 
If the reason for this behavior is that managers of 
monopolistic firms are more risk-averse, rather than 
that they face more favorable market opportunities, 
the Galbraith-Caves thesis has important 
implications. It implies, for example, that the 
innumerable empirical studies that relate firm or 
industry performance ... to market structure are 
misspecified in that they implicitly assume that all 
firms have identical risk preferences. 
Heggestad (1977) regressed (a questionable measure of) risk 
Luckett (1980) provides a possible explanation for the observed 
liability mix. In his discussion of liquidity management, Luckett 
posits that management philosophy is a major determinant of the extent 
to which individual banks use confidence—sensitive funds (federal funds 
purchased, large CDs, and other bank liabilities for borrowed money). 
Aggressively managed (less risk averse) banks with large volumes of CDs 
would exhibit low ratios of demand deposits to total deposits. 
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adjusted profits for 238 banks in 60 SMSAs on the three-bank 
concentration ratio and a number of other independent variables 
affecting bank profits. Heggestad could not reject the hypothesis that 
"market structure has a significant influence on profitability after 
holding all other determinants constant including risk." He concluded 
that "risk is an important determinant of bank profits," and his results 
indicated an interaction between market power and risk. 
Rhoades and Rutz (1982) criticized Heggestad's methodology because 
he had: a) assumed that all banks had a constant risk-return trade-off, 
b) used a relatively small sample, and c) not tested directly for a 
relationship between risk and market structure. In order to obtain more 
reliable results, Rhoades and Rutz used data on 6500 unit banks to test 
the hypothesis that market power and bank risk are inversely related. 
Four measures of risk — the coefficient of variation of profits, the 
equity to total assets ratio, the total loan to total assets ratio, and 
the ratio of net loan losses to total loans — were regressed on the 
three-firm concentration ratio and other independent variables in four 
separate equations. Empirical results were consistent with the 
Galbraith-Caves or "quiet-life" hypothesis; as concentration rose, 
profits rose and risks fell. 
14 Expense-preference hypothesis 
Edwards (1977), citing empirical evidence that new bank entry 
resulted in reduced staff operating costs for existing banks (Fraser and 
14 It should be noted that the Galbraith-Caves and expense-
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Rose, 1972), tested the hypothesis that banks in more concentrated 
markets tend to have relatively high staff expenditures. Edwards 
aggregated banking data within each of 44 SMSÂs in three separate years, 
1962, 1964, 1966, and regressed a) number of employees, and b) total 
wages on a concentration measure and six other independent variables. 
To represent the effect of concentration on bank activity, a 
dichotomous concentration variable was derived using Quandt's "switching 
of regimes" technique. Edwards found that the critical level of 
concentration was 76%, implying that bank action is not affected by 
concentration until the concentration level reaches or exceeds 76%. 
Other independent variables appearing in one or more equations were a) 
SMSA personal income, b) SIdSA average nznufacturing wage rate, c) a 
unit-branch dummy variable, d) the ratio of bank loans to bank deposits 
in the SMSA, e) the ratio of bank demand deposits to bank savings 
deposits in the SMSA, and f) the average number of branches per bank. 
Statistical results revealed that the coefficient on the 
dichotomous concentration variable was significant and positive in all 
equations, leading Edwards to conclude that he could not reject the 
expense-preference hypothesis. The findings suggested that monopolistic 
banks do indeed have greater labor expenses and more employees than 
banks in less concentrated markets. In addition, it appeared that 
monopolistic banks tended to have high labor expenses because they 
preference hypotheses are generally associated with firms in which 
management actions are largely independent of the desires of the f irms' 
owners, typically because of large firm size. 
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hired excessive numbers of employees rather than because they were 
paying higher than average salaries. 
Hannan (1979) used essentially the same methodology as Edwards but 
claimed his data were "different and in many respects superior 
The data set included observations on 367 banks in 49 rural and urban 
Pennsylvania markets. Since Hannan's data were not aggregated within 
markets, be was able to assess the impact of concentration on individual 
banks. The unit-branch dummy utilized in Edward's study was eliminated 
by Hannan and a bank market share variable was added. Quandt's 
switching technique was used, and Hannan found that the critical level 
of concentration was 63% as opposed to Edward's 76%. 
Overall, the empirical results were consistent with the expense-
preference hypothesis and quite similar to Edward's results. The 
dichotomous concentration variable coefficient was positive and 
significant in all equations indicating that managers at monopoly banks 
hire excessively large staffs and pay relatively large wage bills. 
Hannan concluded, as did Edwards, that monopoly banks have large wage 
bills not because they pay high wages or salaries but because they hire 
excessive staff. 
Hannan and Mavinga (1980) proposed that expense-preference behavior 
requires management control of banks in addition to operating within a 
highly concentrated market. The two previous studies that had applied 
the expense-preference hypothesis to banking had not distinguished 
between manager-controlled and owner-controlled banks. In order to 
account for differences in firm control, Hannan and Mavinga devised a 
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dichotomous variable which took a value of one if the bank's largest 
shareholder owned less than 10% of the bank's common stock and a value 
of zero if the largest shareholder owned more than 25% of the bank's 
common stock. The data set utilized to test the e:q>ense~preference 
hypothesis consisted of observations on individual banks in 49 
Pennsylvania banking markets. 
Hannan and Mavinga's empirical model included three separate 
dependent variables: total wage and salary expenditures, furniture and 
equipment expenditures, and net occupancy expense. Independent 
variables were similar to those used by Hannan except for the addition 
of a market population density variable and a variable representing the 
interaction between the dichotomous concentration variable (with the 
critical value being 63%) and the dichotomous management-owner control 
variable. Regression equations were estimated with and without the 
interaction variable to determine the impact of differences in bank 
control on the concentration variable. 
When equations were estimated without the interaction variable, the 
concentration variable coefficient was found to be significant and 
positive in all equations. However, when the interaction variable was 
included, the concentration variable was generally insignificant and the 
interaction variable was generally significant. The results imply that 
type of control, owner vs. manager, plays a significant role in 
determination of certain bank expenditures. Manager-controlled banks 
that operate in noncompetitive markets tend to have larger expenditures 
on items preferred by managers. The authors concluded that their 
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empirical results generally supported the expense-preference hypothesis, 
but strangely enough, the only equations that did not reveal significant 
results for the interaction variable were the staff expenditure 
equations. 
Rhoades (1980) proposed that the list of items preferred by 
managers could be much more inclusive that those indicated by previous 
researchers. He saw no reason a priori why monopoly bank managers 
should prefer staff expenditures over other types of expenditures. To 
test this broader version of the expense-preference hypothesis, Rhoades 
obtained detailed cost information from banks who had participated in 
the Functional Cost Analysis program. The sample consisted of 524 banks 
in 223 SMSAs and 129 counties. 
Rhoades estimated equations for each of 17 dependent variables. 
Twelve of the dependent variables represented ratios of expenditures on 
various items to total assets. Remaining variables were: a) all other 
expenses to total assets, b) total operating expenses to total assets, 
c) total assets to number of employees, d) total assets to number of 
administrative officers, and e) total assets to number of processing 
officers. The three-bank concentration ratio was one of ten 
independent variables included in the model. 
Empirical results revealed that the concentration variable was 
significant in only five of 12 specific expenditure equations and not 
significant in the five remaining equations. Rhoades noted that the 
results generally did not support the expense-preference hypothesis. 
In order to determine the sensitivity of results to choice of 
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sample, Rhoades utilized a larger sample (3120 banks) that was not 
limited to Functional Cost Analysis program participants. Because 
detailed cost information was not available for all banks, the number of 
dependent variables was reduced. Dependent variables used with the 
larger sample included ratios of the following items to total assets: 
a) salaries, b) gross occupancy expense, c) net occupancy expense, d) 
furniture and equipment expense, e) other operating expenditures, and 
f) total operating expense. Other variables were the ratio of total 
assets to number of employees and officers, and the ratio of net income 
to total assets. Independent variables were unchanged from the large 
sample analysis. 
Statistically, the larger sample performed no better than the 
smaller sample. In several equations, the concentration variable 
exhibited a theoretically incorrect sign implying an inverse 
relationship between concentration and expenditures. Not all results 
were perverse, however. Rhoades observed a significant positive 
relationship between the ratio of net income to total assets and 
concentration. Another interesting result, and one that appears to be 
consistent with two previous expense-preference studies, was the 
significant negative relationship between concentration and the ratio of 
assets to employees. Despite this finding, Rhoades concluded that his 
results generally did not support the expense-preference hypothesis. 
Summary 
A review of the bank performance literature has revealed several 
key issues that will have an impact on the methodology to be used later 
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in this study: 
1. although the evidence is not overwhelming, previous results 
indicate that nonbank competitors should be incorporated into 
measures of market concentration, 
2. bank management has not been appropriately accounted for and 
this deficiency might have influenced the empirical results of 
previous structure-performance studies, 
3. management risk aversion and management expenditure decisions 
may be influenced by the level of concentration in the market, 
4. improper delineation of banking markets or improper use of 
market information might have contributed to the inconclusive 
results of past structure-performance studies. 
The empirical shortcomings of the structure-performance literature and 
the implications of the structure-utility literature for correcting 
those shortcomings will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III. MODELING BANK PERFORMANCE 
In previous studies of the relationship between market structure 
and bank performance, bank management has not been utilized as an 
explanatory variable. The omission of this logically important variable 
can be weakly justified by the fact that bank management is not easily 
quantified (recall Bryan 1972). Theoretically and empirically, however, 
the omission of management as an explanatory variable cannot be 
justified in the absence of necessary adjustments to statistical 
procedures. Empirical models that exclude management as an explanatory 
variable theoretically suffer from specification errors which may 
confound the relationship between bank performance and market structure. 
The first section of this chapter contains a discussion of 
statistical shortcomings of previous bank structure-performance studies. 
The second section presents a general model of the banking firm which is 
used to justify the inclusion of management as an explanatory variable 
in empirical models. In the final section of the chapter, an empirical 
model of the banking firm is derived. 
Empirical Shortcomings of Previous Studies 
Many regression studies of the relationship between bank perform­
ance and market structure have suffered from a potentially serious 
specification error, namely the exclusion of management as a relevant 
explanatory variable.This specification error raises doubts about 
^^ As noted in the previous chapter, this problem may be nonexistent 
if banking data are aggregated within markets and management is randomly 
distributed among banks. 
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the legitimacy of hypotheses tests of regression coefficients and in 
some cases might have created simultaneous equation bias. 
Kmenta (1971) shows that tests of significance concerning the 
coefficients of included explanatory variables are no longer valid when 
a relevant variable has been excluded from the regression model. The 
estimator of the variances of included variables has an upward bias 
which tends to lead to "unduly conservative conclusions." Hypotheses of 
zero-valued coefficients are not rejected as frequently as they would be 
if the model were correctly specified. In addition, the estimator of 
coefficients on included explanatory variables is inconsistent if the 
excluded variable is correlated with included explanatory variables. 
The second potential problem, simultaneous equation bias, arises 
when a variable on the right hand side of a regression equation is not 
independent of the error term. In those cases when management is 
excluded as an explanatory variable, management becomes a factor in the 
error term. If a measure of bank performance is included as a right 
hand side variable, that variable will not be independent of the error 
term given the reasonable assumption that management influences bank 
performance. 
A relatively simple regression model can be used to illustrate the 
problems just discussed. Let a firm specific equation be written: 
P - a + bjC +J2 + .Xj b,X, + e, (1) 
where P = a measure of bank profitability or some other 
specified measure of bank performance. 
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C = a measure of market concentration, 
R. = financial ratio i derived from bank financial 
statements, 
Xj = other explanatory variable j. 
The model is designed to estimate the relationship between bank 
performance P and market structure C. The other right hand side 
variables, and X^ , are included to control for non-structure factors 
that theoretically influence bank performance. 
The model, which is typical of models in the structure-performance 
literature, fails to account for the influence of bank management in any 
way, hence management is an excluded relevant explanatory variable. One 
problem that arises from this specification error is upward bias of the 
estimator of variances as mentioned earlier. The statistical result is 
increased probability of not rejecting the hypothesis that b^  = 0, which 
is a potential explanation for the observed weak relationships between 
market structure and bank performance. 
In addition, suppose that management's level of risk aversion is 
influenced by the level of concentration in the market as implied by the 
Galbraith-Caves hypothesis. Then management might be described by the 
simple relationship: 
(2") 
M = yC + 0 X+ u » 
where M is a quantitative representation of management, C is the measure 
of market concentration, and X is a measurement of management ability. 
The terms Y and 0 are unknown parameters and v is a random variable with 
mean zero. 
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Suppose Equation (1) is estimated, but the "true" relationship is: 
m n 
P = a + b.C + I b R. + Z b.X + b .M + e. (3) 
 ^ 1=2  ^ j=nri-l  ^^  
Then, by substituting Equation (2) into Equation (3), it becomes 
apparent that the coefficient on the concentration variable is biased: 
m n 
The direction of bias is unknown because the theoretical sign of Y in 
Equation (2) is not known, and empirically, it is not possible to 
separate the components of the coefficient on C. Of course, the 
relationship between management and concentration in Equation (2) is only 
postulated, but it does serve to illustrate a potential source of bias 
in the observed concentration coefficient. 
There are, then, two potential effects of specification error on 
hypothesis tests about market structure. First, there is an upward 
bias in the estimators of variances. Second, the coefficient on the 
structure variable may be biased in an unknown direction. The net 
effect on hypothesis tests is indeterminate. If the coefficient on the 
market concentration variable is biased downward, t-statistics are too 
small and specification error provides an explanation for observed weak 
structure-performance relationships.^  ^ On the other hand, if the 
Of course, observed weak relationships may also be attributed to 
errors in measuring market concentration, including exclusion of nonbank 
competitors (see Osborne and Wendel 1983). 
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coefficient on market structure is biased upward, the ultimate direction 
of error depends on the relative bias of both variances and 
coefficients. If the coefficient bias is larger, t-statistics will be 
too large, but if the coefficient bias is smaller, t-statistics will be 
too small. 
Some, but not all, studies have included financial ratios, R^ , as 
right hand side variables in order to control for cost differences or 
risk differences among banks (recall that Rhoades (1981) used the loan 
to asset ratio to control for portfolio risk). Given that these 
variables are influenced by management, they will not be independent of 
the error term and simultaneous equation bias will exist. This problem 
would exist regardless of whether or not management was included as an 
explanatory variable as long as ordinary least squares was used as an 
estimating procedure. A solution would be to recognize such variables 
as endogenous variables since they are likely to be influenced by 
management, and estimate coefficients using a multiple equation 
procedure such as two-stage least squares. 
Previous structure-performance studies might have suffered from 
specification errors as just illustrated. In order to properly test the 
hypothesis proposed in this study, it will be necessary to derive a more 
complete empirical model that accounts for the impact of management on 
bank performance. In the next section, a relatively simple theoretical 
model of the banking firm will be used to construct the framework of a 
more complete empirical model. 
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Theoretical Model of the Banking Firm 
It is assumed that hank management's goal is to maximize expected 
utility where expected utility is a twice differentiable function of the 
single argument profit, Profit is determined by the mathematical 
relationship: 
IT = Za.r.E. — Zr.D. - Zw N, - Zr^ IL. - L(E, ,D.,R) (5) 1 1 1  ]  J  n h  i l  i j  
where E, = earning asset i which may or may not be sold in a 
perfectly competitive market, 
= the rate of gain or loss on earning asset i, 
r^  = the contractual rate of return on earning asset i, 
D. = deposit or liability type j which may or may not be 
 ^ obtained in a perfectly competitive market, 
rj = the contractual rate paid on deposit type j, 
= human capital unit h, 
w^  = wage or salary per unit of human capital h, 
= capital asset 1 (building, equipment, supplies), 
r^  = rental rate or depreciation rate on capital asset 1, 
L = liquidity adjustment cost, 
R = reserves (vault cash and reserve balances). 
The value of is not known with certainty at the beginning of the 
planning period, therefore it represents risk to the bank. For loans, 
a can range from zero to one where zero represents a complete write-off 
of a loan and one represents complete repayment or recovery of a loan. 
For nonloan investments, a can hypothetically range from zero for a 
total write-off to some positive value greater than one for a capital 
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gain. 
The liquidity adjustment cost relationship is also a source of risk 
to the bank. At the beginning of each planning period, management does 
not know with certainty what future deposit withdrawals will be. If net 
deposit withdrawals are negative (withdrawals exceed amounts newly 
deposited), management must cover the net outflow by reducing reserves, 
increasing borrowings, or liquidating earning assets. Except in those 
cases where reserves exceed withdrawals, liquidity adjustment is costly 
to the bank. Liquidation of earning assets generally is not costless, 
and borrowed funds must be borrowed at a penalty rate. Highly liquid 
assets are less costly to liquidate than are highly illiquid assets, but 
excessive holdings of highly illiquid assets reduce the potential 
earnings of the asset portfolio (see Baltensperger 1980 or Spellman 1982 
for a relatively simple mathematical form of the liquidity cost 
relationship). 
The bank may be a perfect competitor in some asset markets and a 
nonperfect competitor in other asset markets. For example, in the 
market for government and municipal securities, the bank is likely to be 
a rate taker. In the market for loans, the bank may be a rate setter. 
Given a downward sloping demand curve for loans, the rate set by the 
bank would influence the quantity demanded of loans during the planning 
period. The parameters of the loan demand function, which would not be 
known with certainty to management, would be partially determined by the 
level of competition in the relevant market and partially by local 
economic conditions. 
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In the liability markets, it is assumed that the bank has the 
ability to set net rates of return (contractual rate paid less unbilled 
services provided to deposit customers) on some liabilities while it is 
a rate taker on others. In the market for demand deposits and savings 
deposits, the bank is likely to be a nonperfect competitor. On the 
other hand, the bank may be a perfect competitor in the market for 
large time deposits. Much like loan demand functions, the parameters of 
liability supply functions are partially determined by competition in 
the relevant market and partially by local economic conditions. 
Management does not know the parameters of liability supply functions 
with certainty. 
Bank management maximizes expected utility subject to two 
constraints. One is the technical constraint: 
F(E^ ,Dj,Nj^ ,K^ ) = 0. 
The technical constraint is relevant to the optimization process because 
the bank "can maintain a stock of earning assets or deposits on its 
balance sheet only by constantly producing a flow of services to its 
customers and thus constantly incurring a flow of costs" (Sealy and 
Lindley 1977). "These services... are produced by the bank with inputs 
of real resources under a given technology" (Baltensperger 1980). 
Spellman (1982) likens the depository firm to a production firm that 
transforms currency or funds into earning assets with the use of labor 
and capital. 
A second constraint is the balance sheet identity: 
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lE^  + R + = ZDj + W. (7) 
W represents the bank's capital accounts which cannot be appreciably 
increased over the planning period. The balance sheet identity is 
relevant to the optimization process because one dollar of liabilities 
or capital can be converted into no more than one dollar of financial 
assets. 
Because of the uncertainties associated with demand for bank assets 
and supplies of liabilities in imperfectly competitive markets, the bank 
optimization process consists of two stages. Initially, management 
selects an optimal balance sheet based on all available information. 
Once an optimal balance sheet has been selected, management sets rates 
based on its perception of supply and demand parameters, and customers 
respond accordingly. Not unlike production firms that operate under 
uncertainty, banks "can plan their future costs, revenues, and profits, 
but they can never be certain that external events will permit them to 
achieve these goals" (Stigum and Branch, 1983). 
First order conditions for determining an optimal balance sheet 
are: 
_ 3E(U) + A F + A- = 0 i = l,...,m (8) 
(9) 
2 3 J 
J 1 ) * " " (10) 
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h = 1,...,p (11)  
"M ~ + A, = 0 1 = l,...,q 
%! 
(12) 
F(E.,D.,N^ ,K^ ) =0 (13) 
= ZE. + R + ZK- - ZB - w = 0 (14) 
SAg 1 1 J 
where E(U) represents expected utility. 
The terms and A^  represent Lagrangian multipliers associated 
with the technical relationship and the balance sheet constraint. The 
terms F , F_ , F , and F in Equations (8), and (10)-(12) represent 
i j  ^ X 
first derivatives of the technical relationship with respect to earning 
assets, liabilities, labor, and capital. Ratios of those derivatives 
would represent rates of product transformation, marginal physical 
products, or rates of technical substitution depending on whether 
derivatives represented inputs or outputs or both. 
The interpretation of Equations (8) through (12) is similar to 
Henderson and Quandt's (1971) interpretation of first order conditions 
for a joint output technology with the exception that marginal expected 
utilities replace prices. For example, substitute the information from 
Equation (9) into Equation (8), and allow reserves to vary 
simultaneously with earning assets. Then, given two earning assets, E^  
and E^ , we have: 
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(3E(U)/3Ei) - OE(U)/3R) 
(3E(U)/3E2) - (3E(U)/3R) 
(15) 
Similar relationships can be derived from Equations (9) and (10) for two 
liabilities and D2: 
(3E(D)/3D,) + (3E(U)/3R) Ftj, 
1  ,  (16 )  
(3E(U)/3D2) + (3E(U)/3R) Fg^  
and from Equations (8), (9), and (10) for asset E^  and liability D^ : 
(3E(U)/3Ep - (3E(U)/3R) FEj 
(17) 
(3E(U)/3Dp + (3E(U)/3R) Fj,^  
The relationships state that utility is maximized when technical rates 
of transformation between balance sheet items are equated to ratios of 
marginal expected utilities. The relationships imply that differences 
in real resource costs among balance sheet items will influence optimal 
levels of assets and liabilities. An expected utility maximization 
model that ignored the technological relationship would require only 
that marginal expected utilities be equated, and quantitative results 
could differ. 
First order conditions also yield the following relationship: 
(3E(U)/3K) - (3E(U)/3R)^  F^   ^
3E(U)/3N F^  
Under conditions of uncertainty, the rate of technical substitution 
between capital and labor is equated to the ratio of marginal expected 
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utilities rather than the ratio of prices. The expected marginal utility 
of reserves R enters the relationship if capital inputs are assumed to 
be fixed capital. Given liability and equity accounts, an increase in 
fixed capital requires a decrease in reserves. The implication is that 
less fixed capital will be employed in a financial firm, ceteris 
paribus, than in a firm that is not subject to the balance sheet 
constraint. 
Finally, relationships between balance sheet items (EL, D^ ) and 
real resources (K, N) can be derived from first order conditions. Using 
as an example the relationship between and K, we have: 
This and similar relationships state that expected utility is maximized 
when the ratio of expected marginal utilities is equated to the rate of 
transformation between real resources and balance sheet item services. 
The relationship indicates that efficiency of resource use will affect 
optimal levels of some if not all choice variables. 
While the first order conditions described above shed little 
light on the determinants of optimal choice variables, they do expose 
theoretical links between management and bank performance. 
Specifically, those links are the utility function and the technical 
relationship. The structure-utility literature has empirically explored 
the relationship between management utility and market structure, but 
little has been said about management ability, resource utilization, and 
f3E(U)/3E,) - (3E(U)/3R) F, 
C19) 
(3E(U)/3K) - (3E(U)/3R) F^ 
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firm structure. The purpose of the next two sections is to explore the 
relationships among management ability, resource utilization, and firm 
structure in order to incorporate both utility and management ability 
into the theoretical model. 
Management ability, firm size, and firm structure 
Recent theoretical literature that attempts to explain the 
coexistence of firms of varying size within industries provides a link 
between management ability and the technical structure of firms. The 
literature may also provide clues as to how bank management ability can 
be measured or proxied for empirical purposes. 
Lucas (1978) derived a theoretical model explaining the 
distribution of firm sizes given an underlying distribution of 
managerial ability. Lucas assumed that all individuals in the work 
force have skills that allow them to be either workers or managers. He 
further assumed that all individuals are alike as workers but that 
managerial talent is distributed unequally; some individuals are simply 
more efficient at converting inputs into outputs. Given the 
distribution of managerial ability, profit maximization leads to an 
equilibrium in which some individuals are workers, some individuals are 
managers, and those managers with greater ability are associated with 
larger firms. Lucas did not attempt to explain why some individuals are 
more able managers than others but rather stated, "... whatever 
managers do, some do it better than others." 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), in an earlier theoretical article 
pertaining to the organization of production, revealed a possible source 
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of variability of efficiency among managers. The authors state that 
"team" production requires monitoring of workers in order to reduce 
shirking and to match rewards with productivity of inputs. If 
correlation between input productivity and rewards is weak within a 
firm, then productivity will be low. The implication is that managers 
who have greater ability to coordinate resources, including matching 
productivity with rewards, will be capable of deriving more output from 
a given quantity of inputs. Alchian and Demsetz strengthen this notion 
by stating that, "Efficient production with heterogeneous resources is a 
result not of having better resources but in knowing more accurately the 
relative productivity of these resources." 
Oi (1983) utilized the concept of managerial or entrepreneurial 
efficiency and derived a theoretical model that was highly consistent 
with empirical observations of heterogeneous firms within industries. Oi 
postulated that managers perform two functions, namely making production 
coordination decisions and monitoring workers. Given a fixed amount of 
time, more efficient managers were assumed to generate more coordinating 
effort. Initially, Oi assumed that all workers were homogeneous, and 
each required the same amount of monitoring time. 
Output was posited to be a joint function of labor N and management 
effort T: 
Q = f{N,T). 
Management effort was a function of the amount of time available to 
management H, the number of hours required to monitor each worker h, and 
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management ability A: 
T = X(H-hN). 
Profit maximization resulted in the following first order condition; 
Pf^  = w + 6, 
where P is the competitive price of each unit of output, f^  is the 
marginal product of labor, w is the competitive wage rate paid to labor, 
and 6 is the implicit monitoring cost of labor (6 = PXhf^ . The 
implications of the model under competitive profit maximization are 
fairly straightforward and intuitively appealing. Given prices and the 
parameters of the production function, more efficient management will 
lead to: 1) more employees, 2) greater output, and 3) greater output 
17 per employee. 
Oi later allowed capital to enter the production function with the 
assumption that capital does not require monitoring. The first order 
conditions for profit maximization give: 
fjj/fjj = (w+ô)/r. 
where f^  is the marginal product of capital and r is the per unit cost 
of capital. Definitions of other terms are unchanged from above. 
Again, the implications are fairly straightforward. For a given set of 
In imperfectly competitive markets, it is possible than the more 
able manager will use fewer employees that the less able manager at 
equilibrium. However, the latter two conclusions will hold regardless of 
the level of competition in the market. 
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prices and production function parameters, more efficient management 
will lead to : 1) more employees and more capital (but again this is not 
necessarily true in an imperfectly competitive market), 2) greater 
output, and 3) greater output per employee or greater output per unit of 
capital or both. Given the plausible assumption that there are no 
inferior inputs, output per employee will rise because of differences in 
monitoring costs between labor and capital. The shadow price of 
monitoring time increases as management efficiency increases, hence 
there is a stronger incentive for more able managers to substitute 
18 
capital for labor. 
Finally, Oi allowed firms to hire heterogeneous workers who vary in 
terms of productivity. More productive employees provide more units of 
labor service per unit of work time than less productive employees, 
perhaps due to greater training or experience. The relevant production 
relationship is: 
Q = f (K,vi, M,X [H-hM]) . 
The firm hires M workers and receives y M units of work effort or labor 
services. In addition, Oi assumed that a worker's wage, w, is 
positively associated with his productivity, v. In other words, more 
productive workers command a higher wage rate (w*(u) > 0). 
Interestingly, if a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production 
technology is assumed, the management efficiency parameter does not 
affect the rate of technical substitution between labor and capital. 
All firms would operate on a common expansion path, and the labor to 
capital ratio would decrease as firms became larger and moved away from 
the origin along the expansion path. 
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Given that the choice variables are K, y, and M, profit 
maximization requires that : 
P = r/fj, = w (u)/ (yfjj - Xhf^ ) = w'(y)/f^ . 
The first two terms of the equality are familiar. They state simply 
that the optimal quantity of capital occurs where the value of marginal 
product of capital is equal to the price of capital (Pf^ = r). The last 
two terms assure that the total cost of the labor input is being 
minimized. All terms taken together assure a global maximum given 
variability in worker productivity and wage rates. 
While the last model Is more complicated than the previous two, the 
implications for the structure of the firm are similar. Because of the 
higher shadow price of monitoring time for more able managers, those 
individuals economize on monitoring time by hiring fewer but more 
efficient employees. Management essentially substitutes "quality for 
quantity" as management ability and firm size increase. 
Overall, Oi's model implies the following about better managed 
firms: 1) better managed firms tend to be larger, 2) better managed 
firms tend to have lower labor to capital ratios, 3) better managed 
firms tend to have workers who are more efficient and receive higher 
wages, and 4) better managed firms tend to have higher average products, 
particularly with respect to labor. 
Bank management ability and real resource utilization 
Aside from the exceptions pertaining to imperfect competition, Oi's 
model should be readily applicable to the banking firm. In fact, some 
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of the implications arising from Oi's model are consistent with 
empirical observations of "high performance" banks. In the FDIC-ABA 
studies cited in Chapter I, nonlabor expenses were consistently lower at 
high profit banks. In three of the four studies (two presented the same 
data), the occupancy expense to assets ratio and the fixed assets to 
total assets ratio were consistently lower at high profit banks. In 
the fourth study, which did not look at either ratio, the overhead 
expense to earning assets ratio was found to be lower. 
Regarding efficiency of labor utilization, the studies were also 
generally consistent with Oi's monitoring cost hypothesis. Two studies 
looked at assets per employee while a third looked at deposits per 
employee, and all three indicated that employees were used more 
effectively at high profit banks. Two studies found that payroll 
expenses (wages and benefits) per employee were greater for high profit 
banks, but a third study found that average salary per employee was 
19 
smaller at high profit banks. 
Bank management ability and balance sheet structure 
Oi's model is intuitively appealing and consistent with 
observations of real resource structure at high profit banks. The model 
may also provide a theoretical link between management ability and bank 
balance sheet structure since services associated with assets and 
These apparently conflicting results may not be inconsistent with 
Oi's hypothesis. Data indicate that the ratio of nonwage benefits to 
total wages and benefits rises with firm size (ergo management ability). 
See Oi (1983, pp. 148-149). 
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liabilities are produced with real resources. 
Because management time is a fixed allocatable input, balance sheet 
item services can be described as joint outputs regardless of whether 
assets and liabilities are technically related (see Shumway, Pope, and 
Nash (1984) for a discussion of allocatable fixed inputs and jointness 
in production). Technology can be described by separate production 
functions that are interrelated through the constraint on fixed 
management time. Given the profit relationship in Equation (5), the 
technical relationships can be written: 
Ei = fi(Ni,Ki,T^ ) i=l,...,m (20) 
j - (21) 
20 
where T is Oi's representation of managerial effort. Labor and 
capital may or may not be homogeneous among production functions which 
are unique to each balance sheet item as indicated by the subscripts on 
f and g. 
Using Oi's concept of management ability further. Equations (20) 
and (21) can be rewritten as: 
\  (22) 
Dj = gj (Nj ,X[H^ -hN^  ]) (23) 
Original subscripts on N and K are suppressed to simplify 
notation. 
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where X is the management ability parameter that varies among managers. 
therefore management time variables and become choice variables 
subject to the constraint: 
where H is the total amount of time available to management. 
Expected utility maximization now occurs subject to constraints 
represented by Equations (7), (22), (23), and (24). Because production 
functions are unique to each balance sheet item, production functions 
can be substituted for assets and liabilities in the expected utility 
function and the balance sheet constraint. First order conditions for 
optimization are: 
Management time must be allocated among assets E^  and liabilities D., 
H = ZH. + IH. 
1 2 
(24) 
3E(U) 
3R 3R 
+ *2 = 0 (25) 
h = 1 
1 = 1 J • • •  
h — l,...,p (27) j = 1,... ,n 
1 = 1 
j = 1 (29) 
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m + = ° (30) 
3 - 1  "  » »  
li;=i-zH,-rH. = o 1 :;:::::: »« 
F ; = "  .(•) + R + ZK- -Zg.(-) - w = 0, i = l,...,m (33) 
 ^  ^ j = l,...,n 
1 = l,...,q 
Langrangian multipliers and are associated with the management 
time constraint and the balance sheet constraint, respectively. 
Given Oi's production relationship f(N,K,T,) and Equations (22) and 
(23), it is apparent that: 
% -
apj _, „ 
(37) 
Then utilizing information from Equation (25), we can write: 
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f - )( V. - (38) 
h^i "hi "hi ""hi 
' = ( 3E(U) _ 8E(U) 3E(U) 3E(U) „ 
 ^ *^ 17 'SD / ^  y w " >>T> ~ U 
az 
SKii  ^ 9Ej, 3R 3R (40) 
JZ' _ ( ^ ) + mD ) g + IÊSV) _ J|(U) = 0 (41) 
3K^   ^ 3Dj 3R  ^^  SK^  3R 
Equations (38) through (43) indicate that optimal values of inputs, 
hence balance sheet items, are generally functions of X, the management 
ability parameter. More importantly, the equations can be used to show 
that the rate of transformation between balance sheet items is a 
function of management ability. 
Equation (42) yields the following information about two earning 
assets Ej^ and E^: 
which can be simplified to: 
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c  - 1  •  
Equation (45) states that the ratio of marginal expected utilities of 
two earning assets must be equated to the technical rate of substitution 
between allocated managerial efforts. As long as costs or technologies 
differ between assets with respect to managerial effort, a change in 
X will cause the two marginal products to change at different rates. 
This conclusion follows from Equations (20) and (22) which indicate that 
f^  will generally be a function of X. The implication is that different 
levels of management ability will result in different ratios of earning 
assets, all other things equal. Similar conclusions concerning 
liabilities and combinations of assets and liabilities can be drawn from 
Equations (42) and (43). The overall results indicate that management 
ability should be included as an explanatory variable in an empirical 
model of bank performance. 
Empirical Model of the Banking Firm 
Given management's utility function, supply and demand functions 
for balance sheet items, probability density functions for capital gains 
and losses, parameters of the liquidity cost function, and parameters of 
technical relationships, one could determine optimal values of E^ , R, 
Dj, N^ , and from Equations (25) through (33). Generally, optimal 
values would be determined simultaneously and would be functions of all 
parameters of the system of equations. Unfortunately, complexity of the 
model in its current state does not allow solving for choice variables 
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or even determining static conditions. However, the model does provide 
guidelines for construction of an empirical model of the banking firm 
that accounts for the influence of management on bank performance. 
As noted in Chapter I, two financial ratios - the ratio of loans to 
total assets and the ratio of time and savings deposits to total 
deposits - were chosen to represent bank performance in the empirical 
model. The theoretical model clearly indicates that those ratios are 
endogenous to the banking firm. Other reasons for utilizing those 
particular variables are 1) they are not heavily influenced by 
accounting procedures, and 2) they have been found to be empirically 
related to both bank profitability and market concentration. 
Right hand side variables properly included in the empirical model 
are closely related to factors listed at the beginning of this section, 
namely parameters of utility functions, supply and demand functions, 
technical relationships, and so on. The remainder of this section 
discusses the derivation of right hand side variables from those factors 
and related information. 
Management utility 
Parameters of management utility functions may be key items in the 
empirical model as indicated by first order conditions for expected 
utility maximization. Suppose, for illustrative purposes only, that 
management's utility function is exponential: 
n(%) = a - be , (46) 
and that profits are normally distributed. Then, management would 
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maximize : 
E(U) = ECtt) - (*/2) , (47) 
and optimal values of choice variables would generally be functions of 
<j), an exogenous measure of risk aversion. Unfortunately, little is 
known about the determinants of management's risk aversion parameter or 
about the relationship between risk aversion and market concentration, 
notwithstanding the structure-utility literature. 
The Galbraith-Caves hypothesis as applied to banking is generally 
based upon the postulate that more risk averse managers will be 
attracted to banks in highly concentrated markets because such banks 
offer a greater opportunity to trade profits for risk (see Edwards and 
Heggestad, 1973). While the postulate is certainly consistent with 
empirical observations, it depends upon the assumption that prospective 
managers ascertain and compare levels of bank market concentration. 
Empirical work conducted by Ratti (1979a) provides support for a 
different postulate which does not depend on the assumption of 
information collection by management, and more importantly, it is 
consistent with observations of high profit banks. 
Ratti statistically investigated financial data for 740 banks in 
the Tenth Federal Reserve District and found that bank performance is 
consistent with an index of relative risk aversion (-TrC"(ir)/U* (tt)) 
that increases in profit. In other words, risk taking appeared to 
decrease as profits increased independently of the exogenous measure of 
risk aversion <^ . Empirical results suggested that "any environmental 
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change that raises (lowers) profits will result in less (more) risk 
taking by banks Environmental change apparently could include 
such things as changes in reserve requirements, changes in competition, 
or even changes in management ability. Ratti's results are consistent 
with low loan to asset ratios observed at monopoly banks as well as high 
profit banks if increased market power or improved management or a 
combination of the two leads to higher profits. 
Of course, Ratti's findings do not preclude the possibility that 
market concentration and are positively associated, particularly if 
high profit banks realize high profits because of greater market 
concentration. However, the necessary assumptions that management 
ascertains and compares levels of market concentration and that market 
concentration is the major determinant of bank profitability appear 
unjustified. 
Ratti's work and the postulate that more risk averse managers are 
associated with less competitive banks imply divergent possibilities for 
the treatment of risk aversion in the empirical model. At one extreme, 
if the structure-utility postulate is indeed true, then <j> would be 
strongly related to market concentration. As indicated by Equation (4), 
failure to properly include an exogenous measure of risk aversion in the 
empirical model would result in a biased concentration coefficient. At 
the other extreme, all management could hypothetically have the same 
utility function (<j>^  = x V^ ) but different levels of relative risk 
aversion due to varying degrees of management ability or market 
concentration. In that case, management ability or market concentration 
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or some combination of the two would explain differences in risk taking, 
and the concentration variable coefficient would be unbiased. 
In reality, it is likely that the relationship between market 
concentration and risk aversion is somewhere between the two extremes 
just illustrated. In other words, the exogenous risk parameter is not 
likely to be the same for all management nor is it likely that the 
exogenous risk parameter is highly correlated with market concentration. 
Under those circumstances, a proper empirical model would incorporate 
the exogenous risk parameter in a theoretically correct manner which 
would eliminate the possibility of bias in the concentration variable 
coefficient. Unfortunately, the theoretical model cannot be solved 
explicitly, therefore the theoretically correct manner of incorporating 
risk aversion into the empirical model is not known. Just as important, 
the task of eliciting risk parameters from bank management would be 
onerous. 
One possible solution to the risk variable dilemma would be to 
include a right hand side variable that could serve as a proxy for the 
exogenous risk aversion parameter. A list of potential variables would 
generally be limited to firm financial data which are not likely to be 
exogenous to the firm. In addition, such data would probably be 
determined by some combination of exogenous risk aversion and relative 
risk aversion as determined by profitability. A second approach would 
be to assume that the impact of relative risk aversion on bank 
performance as determined by profitability is dominant over the impact 
of exogenous risk aversion, and bias created by elimination of the 
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exogenous risk parameter is nominal. It is the latter approach that is 
utilized in this study. While that approach is based on an assumption 
that has no theoretical or empirical basis, it is consistent with Stigum 
and Branch's (1983) statement that "[M]anagement's propensity to assume 
risk will be much greater if the bank is experiencing poor current 
earnings and the projection is for even worse earnings than it would be 
if the bank is experiencing record earnings and forecasts the same for 
the future." 
Market structure 
A second group of variables is related to the parameters of supply 
and demand functions for liabilities and earning assets. For 
liabilities and assets purchased and sold in imperfectly competitive 
markets, a concentration variable should be used as a proxy for slope 
parameters. Competition (structure) is theoretically related to the 
elasticities of supply and demand functions, and elasticity is 
mathematically related to the slopes of those functions. Intercept 
coefficients should be proxied by a variable that explains shifts in 
supply and demand functions. A variable deemed appropriate for this 
role is percentage change in retail sales. Relatively rapid economic 
growth as reflected by growth of retail sales is expected to increase 
loans relative to other assets and increase time and savings deposits 
relative to other liabilities. 
Regarding assets sold in perfectly competitive markets (e.g.. 
Treasury securities), it is assumed that all banks in all markets will 
receive the same rate of return. In order to avoid perfect multi-
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collinearity, all such rates are excluded from the empirical model. 
Unresolved issues are the choice of structure variable(s) and the 
method of incorporating structure variable(s) into the empirical model. 
In order to account for Rhoades' (1984) finding that market share 
impacts bank performance independently of market concentration, two 
structure variables have been computed under three specifications of 
market participation. Deposit Herfindahl indices and deposit market 
21 
shares were calculated utilizing a) banks only, b) banks and savings 
and loans, and c) banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. The two 
structure variables enter equations additively due to their apparent 
independence. 
In addition to Rhoades' work, recall that Osborne and Wendel (1983) 
rejected the notion that market concentration or market structure 
determines bank behavior and argued instead that bank actions determine 
market structure. The obvious implication of Osborne and Wendel's 
argument is that market structure is not necessarily exogenous to 
22 individual banks. As alluded to earlier, number of firms might 
reasonably be considered an exogenous variable since bank regulators 
control entry and mergers, and market concentration might reasonably be 
considered an endogenous variable since management takes actions which 
influence competitors and, in turn, responds to competitors' actions. A 
Raw data were limited to deposit volumes because savings and loan 
assets were aggregated over branch offices of individual firms. A 
single firm could conceivably hold assets in several markets. 
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reasonable solution to the problem of endogenous structure variables is 
the use of two-stage least squares. To test the effect of model 
specification on variable coefficients, single equation models in which 
structure variables are implicitly exogenous are compared with multiple 
equation models in which structure variables are treated explicitly as 
endogenous variables. 
In the multiple equation model, structure variables are treated as 
explanatory endogenous variables in each performance equation. In 
addition, the variability of structure variables is explained in 
separate equations. Exogenous variables that intuitively impact the 
Herfindahl index and market share are number of firms and management 
ability. Specifically, the Herfindahl index is postulated to be a 
function of the number of banks in the market, the number of towns with 
banks, the number of banks per town, and the variability of management 
ability within the market: 
+ "hA + + "hs Vm + "M", + % 
where Hf = Herfindahl index, 
Ijj = number of banks in the market, 
= number of banking towns in the market, 
V = variability (variance) of management ability in the 
market. 
The market share variable is postulated to be a function of the number 
Osborne and Wendel's argument appears to have support in 
nonbanking industries as indicated by research conducted by 
Intriligator, Weston, and De Angelo (1975). 
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of banks in the market, the number of banks within the bank's city, the 
variability of management ability within the market, and the ability of a 
particular bank's own management: 
Sh - Ss + ".A + "32^ 0 + "ssVc + ^34% + •'s5\ + S <«> 
where Sh = market share of an individual bank, 
= number of banks in the market, 
= number of banks in the city, 
X = management ability at a particular bank, 
V = variability (variance) of management ability in the 
market. 
The interaction variable is included to account for the possibility that 
a bank's reaction to firms outside the city will vary with the number of 
competitors inside the city. 
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of market structure, 
data pertaining to banking markets delineated by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago are supplemented with variables to reflect competition 
from PCAs. Since agricultural banks compete directly with PCAs for 
short and intermediate term credit, binary variables representing PCA 
districts in Iowa are included in performance equations. Such variables 
may pick up the effects of geographic location as well as competitiveness 
of PCAs, but there is no reason a priori to expect that location 
factors will vary with PCA districts. 
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Firm size 
Because past research does not provide consistent evidence for or 
against the existence of economies or diseconomies in banking, it is 
desirable to control for any unknown effects of size on bank 
performance. Control of firm size appears to be particularly important 
in an empirical model built upon the theory that bank management ability 
is strongly related to firm size. Without a firm size variable, 
performance differences empirically attributed to management ability 
could actually be due to a combination of economies or diseconomies of 
size and management ability. 
Given the choice variables of the theoretical model, firm size 
would appear to be endogenous to the firm. In order to be theoretically 
consistent, then, the size variable is treated as an endogenous variable 
in the multiple equation model. Exogenous variables that intuitively 
affect firm size are city population, county population density, number 
of firms per capita, and management ability. 
Management ability 
Management ability has been introduced as an exogenous variable in 
relation to market concentration and firm size, but a measure of 
management ability has not been proposed. In this study, management 
ability is represented by the ratio of assets to employees. Obviously, 
management ability is an abstract concept that is neither perfectly 
measurable nor perfectly definable, and any measure chosen to represent 
it is subject to defects. The ratio of assets to employees is no 
exception. 
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One potential problem associated with use of the ratio of assets to 
employees is related to the fact that neither total assets nor number of 
employees is exogenous to the firm. As a result, the ratio may not be 
independent of error terms of equations in which it appears. A second 
potential shortcoming arises from the likelihood that employee 
requirements per dollar of asset vary by type of asset. The implication 
is that the ratio of assets to employees may be closely related to 
parameters of asset demand functions, particularly slope parameters. 
The quantitative impact of the former potential problem on estimates of 
regression coefficients is not known and generally is not ascertainable. 
The impact of the latter potential problem depends on the degree to 
which management ability influences the parameters of asset demand 
23 functions. 
While the ratio of assets to employees may have shortcomings, it 
also has certain benefits. For one, it is consistent with Oi's (1983) 
theoretical model of management ability. Oi's model indicated that as 
management ability increases, management should economize on management 
time by substituting labor quality for labor quantity, and average 
productivity of labor should increase. 
23 The astute reader should have anticipated a potentially more 
serious problem associated with using the ratio of assets to employees 
as a measure of management ability, namely the alleged relationship 
between market structure and labor demand. Results of some expense-
preference studies imply that the ratio of assets to employees should be 
an endogenous variable dependent upon the level of market concentration. 
However, if the premises of the expense-preference theory are true, the 
problem should be insignificant in this study because the great majority 
of banks being analyzed are quite small, hence owner-controlled. 
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Secondly, the ratio is readily available from bank financial data. 
Use of the ratio eliminates the need to elicit personal information 
about management from individual banks which may be beneficial in two 
ways. First, there is no strong evidence that a more direct measure of 
management would be superior to the ratio of assets to employees (recall 
Bryan, 1972, once again). In addition, use of the ratio circumvents 
arguments about who is and who is not bank management. Overall, the 
benefits of using the ratio appear to outweigh the shortcomings, but the 
final conclusion must be based on empirical results rather than 
intuitive arguments. 
Other right hand side variables 
Two additional qualitative variables are included in the empirical 
model to control for possible performance differences between Federal 
Reserve members and nonmembers and between multibank holding company 
affiliates and nonaffiliates. Because the empirical model is estimated 
with data from pre-DIDMCA years (1976, 1978), member banks could have 
been constrained by reserve requirements while nonmember banks were not. 
In addition, holding company affiliates could have held more risky 
assets because of the potential for diversifying holding company assets. 
A third variable reflects the impact of pledging requirements on 
banks' demands for government securities. Federal law and some state 
laws require banks to hold government securities and other eligible 
collateral as a pledge or reserve against government deposits. While 
this variable is not derived explicitly from the theoretical model due 
to the complicated nature of pledging requirements, there is empirical 
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support for the inclusion of this variable in the statistical model. On 
the basis of a study of 740 Tenth District member banks, Ratti (1979b) 
concluded that demand for state and local securities by banks is 
significantly influenced by pledging requirements. 
In Che present study, the dollar amount of government deposits is 
expected to be negatively related to the ratio of loans to assets. The 
magnitude of the relationship is uncertain a priori, however, because 
Iowa did not have a state pledging law as of 1979. 
Mathematical form of the model 
The performance equations can be written mathematically as follows: 
L/TA = a^  + b^ j^ Hf + b^ gSh + b^ S^i + b^ R^ + b^ G^ + b^ gX + b^ F^R 
24 
+ b^ gHC + I b^ . PCA. + e^  (50) 
1=9 
TSD/TD = 3-2 + ^21®^  2^2^  ^+ ^23^  ^ 2^4^  2^5 ^ 2^6^  2^7®^  
23 
+ I b-.PCA. + e (51) 
i=8 
L/TA = ratio of loans to total assets, 
TSD/TD = ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits, 
Hf = Herfindahl index, 
Sh = market share. 
Si = size of firm (total assets). 
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24 R = percentage change in county retail sales, 
G = government deposits, 
X = management ability (ratio of assets to employees), 
FR = Federal Reserve membership dummy, 
HC = multibank holding company affiliate duasny, 
PCA^  = Production Credit Association district dummy. 
Equations that explain endogenous variables in the two-stage model are 
Equations (48) and (49) derived earlier and the equation explaining firm 
size: 
SI - *3 + + "32™ + + ^36'' + «3 
Pg = city population, 
PD = county population density, 
= number of banks in city, 
X = management ability (ratio of assets to employees). 
Equations (50) and (51) are initially estimated without the management 
ability variable X and then with the management ability variable to 
determine the impact of information about management on the market 
structure variable coefficients. Finally, all five equations are 
estimated using two stage least squares to determine the robustness of 
single equation models in which structure variables are implicitly 
assumed to be exogenous. 
24 Even though counties are not used explicitly as banking markets, 
most banking markets closely approximate counties (see maps in Appendix), 
therefore county retail sales should be a reasonable proxy for banking 
market retail sales. 
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Data 
The data set consists of observations on 444 Iowa agricultural 
banks for the years 1976 and 1978. To be counted as an agricultural 
bank, a bank's agricultural loan to total loan ratio had to equal or 
exceed 25 percent in both years. 
In order to eliminate the possibility that large regional banks 
would contaminate measures of market concentration, banks in SMSÂs or 
banks located in markets which contained SMSA metropolitan areas were 
eliminated from the sample. Nine Iowa counties were defined as SMSAs 
25 
as of December 31, 1979: Black Hawk (#81), Dubuque (#26), Johnson 
(#45), Linn (#11), Polk (#24), Pottawattamie (#59), Scott (#20), Warren 
(#79), and Woodbury (#71). In addition, banks in the Burlington banking 
market (#9), the Clinton banking market (#17), and the Fort Madison-
Keokuk banking market (#32) were eliminated from the data set because 
those markets extended into Illinois. 
Nine counties or portions of counties were treated as banking 
markets even though those areas were not defined as banking markets by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Those areas had not been defined 
as banking markets because neither holding company nor bank merger 
applications had originated from those areas (Adams County, Clarke 
County, Dallas County, Davis County, Monroe County, portions of Benton 
County, portions of Butler County, Muscatine County, and portions of 
Numbers in parentheses represent identification numbers of 
banking markets which are delineated on maps located in the Appendix. 
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Palo Alto County). Two agricultural banks in northern Kossuth County 
could not be included in the data set because they did not lie in a 
defined banking market, and the area did not appear to be a reasonable 
approximation for a banking market. 
Financial data for commercial banks were obtained from tapes 
provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Deposit data for savings and loan association branch offices were 
obtained from annual Branch Office Studies provided by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank of Des Moines. Share draft data for credit unions were 
obtained from the 1976 and 1978 issues of Annual Report of Iowa Credit 
Unions (Iowa Credit Union League, 1976, 1978). 
Population data were taken from selected Bureau of the Census 
publications (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1971, 1982). County retail 
sales data came from selected issues of Retail Sales and Use Tax: 
Annual Report (Iowa Department of Revenue, various issues). 
77 
CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In order to determine the comparability of Iowa agricultural banks 
with other banks in the U.S. during the period covered by this study, 
the top 10% of non-SMSA agricultural banks in Iowa in terms of 
profitability (ROA) were isolated and compared with the remaining non-
SMSA agricultural banks in 1976 and 1978. Despite the possibility that 
profitability rates at some Iowa agricultural banks may include a return 
to management, high profit agricultural banks had operating 
characteristics that were quite similar to operating characteristics of 
high profit banks analyzed in the ABA-FDIC studies. In terms of 
portfolio composition, high profit agricultural banks exhibited lower 
ratios of loans to total assets and lower ratios of time and savings 
deposits to total deposits. In terms of operating efficiency, high 
profit Iowa agricultural banks exhibited higher ratios of assets to 
employees and lower ratios of occupancy expense to total assets. These 
results indicate that Iowa agricultural banks are not atypical in terms 
of performance, and empirical results derived in this study should be 
applicable outside the state of Iowa. In the interests of scholarship, 
however, all conclusions herein are strictly applied to the state of 
Iowa. 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Statistics from ordinary least squares equations are shown in 
Tables 1, 2, 4, and 5. Tables 1 and 2 exhibit results from loan 
equations, and Tables 4 and 3 display results from time and savings 
deposit equations. 
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Sinrnnary of regression statistics: ratio of loans to total assets 
Table 1 (1976) and Table 2 (1978) exhibit estimated regression 
coefficients, t-statistics, and coefficients of determination for all 
three levels of market participation (banks; banks and savings and 
loans; banks, savings and loans, and credit unions). For each level of 
market participation, equations were estimated with and without the 
management ability variable. 
In all 12 equations, regressors provided a statistically 
significant explanation of loan to asset ratio variability (all equation 
F-statistics were significant at the .01 level). Coefficients of 
2 determination (R s) shown at the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 do not appear 
to be extremely large, but they are not atypical of cross-sectional 
equations explaining variability of bank balance sheet ratios. 
The first two rows of numbers in each table represent estimated 
equation intercepts and associated t-statistics. The intercept measures 
the mean value of the loan to asset ratio corresponding to zero values 
for all right hand side variables. As might be expected, intercepts in 
all equations were significantly different from zero. Subsequent rows 
of numbers represent estimates of slope parameters and associated t-
statistics for right hand side variables. 
26 2 For example, Milkove and Weisblat (1982) generated an R of .17 
when estimating a loan to deposit equation with data aggregated over 
five unit-banking states. When equations were estimated for individual 
states, R s were .16, .10, .10, .13, and .03. 
Table 1. Estimated regression coefficients and t-statlstlcs: ratio of loans to total assets for 
1976 
Equation 
Variable 
1* 2* 3k 4*) 5C 6= 
Intercept .491*** 
(20.38) 
.532*** 
(16.79) 
.496*** 
(20.79) 
.539*** 
(17.11) 
.496*** 
(20.87) 
.539*** 
(17.16) 
Hf -.021 
(-.25) 
-.049 
(-.57) 
-.065 
(-.65) 
-.098 
(-.98) 
-.066 
(-.67) 
-.100 
(-.99) 
Sh .049 
(.84) 
.062 
(1.06) 
.072 
(1.11) 
.088 
(1.35) 
.073 
(1.12) 
.089 
(1.36) 
Si 1.858E-06** 
(2.53) 
2.430E-06*** 
(3.09) 
1.849E-06** 
(2.51) 
2.444E-06*** 
(3.10) 
1.849E-06** 
(2.51) 
2.444E-06*** 
(3.10) 
R 1.490E-03** 
(2.49) 
1.599E-03*** 
(2.61) 
1.504E-03** 
(2.51) 
1.583E-03*** 
(2.65) 
1.503E-03** 
(2.51) 
1.583E-03*** 
(2.65) 
G 2.528E-04 
(1.63) 
2.098E-04 
(1.34) 
2.510E-04 
(1.62) 
2.059E-04 
(1.32) 
2.509E-04 
(1.62) 
2.058E-04 
(1.32) 
X -4.041E-05** 
(-1.98) 
-4.192E-05** 
(-2.06) 
-4.195E-05** 
(-2.06) 
FR -.061*** 
(-4.11) 
-.060*** 
(-4.07) 
-.061*** 
(-4.11) 
-.060*** 
(-4.06) 
-.061*** 
(-4.11) , 
-.060*** 
(-4.06) 
HC 
PCA, 
.038 
(1.19) 
.011 
(.39) 
.029 
( . 88 )  
.007 
(.24) 
.038 
(1.18) 
.011 
(.40) 
.027 
(.85) 
.007 
(.24) 
.038 
(1.18) 
.011 
(.40) 
.027 
(.85) 
.007 
(.25) 
PCAg 
PCA3 
PCA^  
PCAg 
PCAg 
PCAy 
PCAg 
.022 .018 .022 .018 .022 .018 
(.86) (.72) (.84) (.69) (.84) (.69) 
.014 .016 .016 .018 .016 .018 
(.47) (.53) (.51) (.58) (.51) (.58) 
.052 .051 .056 .055 .056 .055 
(1.34) (1.32) (1.45) (1.42) (1.45) (1.42) 
.040 .042 .041 .043 .041 .043 
(1.19) (1.25) (1.20) (1.28) (1.20) (1.28) 
.006 .003 .006 .002 .006 .002 
(.23) (.12) (.20) (.08) (.20) (.09) 
.027 .024 .030 .028 .030 .028 
(.93) (.82) (1.02) (.94) (1.02) (.94) 
.025 .023 .026 .024 .026 .024 
(.90) (.84) (.92) (.86) (.92) (.86) 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks only. 
and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans. 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Signlficant at .01 level. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
Equation 
Variable 
1* 2* 3" 4b 5= 6= 
-.024 -.024 -.025 -.025 -.025 -.025 
(-.85) (-.87) (-.90) (-.91) (-.89) (-.90) 
.015 .013 .016 .015 .016 .015 
(.44) (.40) (.48) (.45) (.49) (.45) 
-.016 —. 020 -.016 -.021 -.016 -.021 
(-.55) (-.72) (-.57) (-.74) (-.57) (-.73) 
.009 .009 .008 .008 .008 .008 
(.35) (.34) (.29) (.28) (.30) (.29) 
.002 -1.545E-04 9.837E-04 -.002 .001 -.001 
(.06) (-.01) (.03) (-.05) (.03) (-.04) 
.025 .020 .026 .022 .026 .022 
(.78) (.65) (.83) (.69) (.83) (.70) 
.022 .022 .022 .022 .022 .022 
(.82) (.80) (.82) (.80) (.82) (.80) 
.1183 .1264 .1191 .1279 .1192 .1280 
444 444 444 444 444 444 
23 24 23 24 23 24 
PCAg 
PCA^O 
PCA^ l  
PCA12 
PCAi, 
PCA^ S 
r2 
N 
K 
Table 2. Estimated regression coefficients and t-statlstlcs: ratio of loans to total assets 
for 1978 
Variable Equation 
Intercept 
Hf 
.557*** 
(25.15) 
-.123 
(-1.57) 
.592*** 
(19.98) 
-.143* 
( -1 .82 )  
,558*** 
(25.36) 
-.158* 
( - 1 . 6 6 )  
.593*** 
(20.09) 
-.183* 
(-1.91) 
.558*** 
(25.44) 
-.161* 
(-1.69) 
.593*** 
(20.15) 
- .186* 
(-1.94) 
Sh .040 
(.75) 
.052 
(.97) 
.047 
(.77) 
.061 
(.99) 
.049 
(.79) 
.063 
(1.02) 
SI 1.508E-06** 
(2.43) 
1.832E-06*** 
(2.84) 
1.535E-06** 
(2.47) 
1.865E-06*** 
(2.89) 
1.537E-06** 
(2.48) 
1.867E-06*** 
(2.89) 
2.714E-03*** 
(4.68) 
2.823E-03*** 
(4.85) 
2.754E-03*** 
(4.74) 
2.871E-03*** 
(4.92) 
2.756E-03*** 
(4.74) 
2.873E-03*** 
(4.93) 
1.352E-04 
(1.54) 
1.222E-04 
(1.39) 
1.315E-04 
(1.50) 
1.181E-04 
(1.34) 
1.311E-04 
(1.49) 
1.176E-04 
(1.34) 
-2.768E-05* 
(-1.77) 
-2.792E-05* 
(-1.79) 
-2.797E-05* 
(-1.79) 
FR -.048*** 
(-3.46) 
—.048*** 
(-3.46) 
-.048*** 
(-3.46) 
—.048*** 
(-3.46) 
—.048*** 
(-3.46) 
-.048*** 
(-3.46) 
HC .033 
(1.35) 
.026 
(1.05) 
.033 
(1.33) 
.025 
(1.01) 
.032 
(1.32) 
.025 
(1.01) 
PGA, .005 
(.19) 
.005 
(.17) 
.006 
(.24) 
.006 
( . 2 2 )  
.006 
(.24) 
.006 
(.23) 
PCAg .013 
(.53) 
.012 
(.50) 
.013 
(.54) 
.012 
(.51) 
.013 
(.54) 
.012 
(.51) 
PCA3 .018 (.63) 
.021 
(.73) 
.020 
(.68) 
.023 
(.79) 
.020 
(.70) 
.023 
(.80) 
PCA^ .040 
(1.09) 
.037 
(1.03) 
.040 
(1.12) 
.039 
(1.07) 
.041 
(1.13) 
.039 
(1.08) 
PCAg .030 
(.97) 
.032 
(1.01) 
.033 
(1.03) 
.034 
(1.09) 
.033 
(1.04) 
.035 
(1.10) 
PCAg — « 001 
(-.05) 
-.004 
(-.16) 
-3.131E-04 
(-.01) 
-.003 
(-.12) 
-1.793E-04 
(-.01) 
-.003 
(-.11) 
PCAy .044 
(1.59) 
.042 
(1.50) 
.048* 
(1.72) 
.046* 
(1.67) 
.048* 
(1.73) 
.046* 
(1.67) 
PCAg .037 
(1.42) 
.035 
(1.33) 
.038 
(1.44) 
.035 
(1.34) 
.038 
(1.45) 
.035 
(1.35) 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks only. 
and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans. 
and Sh calculated using banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. 
S^ignificant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
Table 2. (continued) 
Equation 
Variable 
PCA„ 
PCA 10 
PCA 11 
PCA 12 
PCA 13 
PCA 14 
PCA 15 
-.012 -.011 -.011 -.010 -.011 -.009 
(-.46) (-.43) (-.41) (-.37) (-.40) (-.36) 
.036 .034 .036 .033 .036 .034 
(1.15) (1.09) (1.14) (1.07) (1.14) (1.08) 
-.009 -.012 -.009 -.011 -.008 -.011 
(-.35) (-.46) (-.32) (-.43) (-.31) (-.42) 
.006 .007 .005 .007 .006 .007 
(.23) (.29) (.21) (.28) (.22) (.29) 
-.005 -.005 -.006 -.006 -.006 -.006 
(-.16) (-.16) (-.18) (-.19) (-.17) (-.18) 
.017 .014 .020 .017 .020 .017 
(.59) (.48) (.67) (.57) (.67) (.57) 
.014 .016 .014 .015 .014 .016 
(.56) (.63) (.54) (.61) (.55) (.61) 
R 
N 
K 
.1494 
444 
23 
.1557 
444 
24 
.1500 
444 
23 
.1564 
444 
24 
.1502 
444 
23 
.1566 
444 
24 
85 
Market structure variables were found to be statistically 
insignificant or weakly significant. In 1976, neither the Herfindahl 
index (Hf) nor the market share variable (Sh) displayed statistical 
significance. In 1978, the Herfindahl index was significantly different 
from zero at the .10 level in five of six equations, but the market 
share variable was significantly different from zero in none. The 
Herfindahl index coefficient exhibited a negative sign in all equations 
which is consistent with Milkove and Weisblat's (1982) finding that 
banks in more concentrated markets tend to have lower loan to asset 
ratios. The market share variable exhibited a positive sign, however, 
which is in contrast to Rhoades' (1984) finding that high market shares 
are associated with high rates of return (ergo low ratios of loans to 
total assets according to the ABA-FDIC and Wall studies). The 
importance of that "incorrect" sign is uncertain because of the 
statistical insignificance of the market share variable. 
There was little statistical evidence that information about 
savings and loans and credit unions improved the explanatory power of 
estimated equations. With the exception of two equations in 1978 
(Equations 1 and 3), levels of significance of market structure 
variables were invariant across specifications of market participation. 
As noted above, all equations were statistically significant at the .01 
level in spite of alternative measures of market concentration and 
2 
market share. When comparing R s across equations, it appears that 
information about savings and loans increases explanatory power 
slightly, and information about credit unions increases explanatory 
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power very little. 
The size variable (Si = $1,000 of total assets) is statistically 
significant at either the .05 level or the .01 level in all equations. 
The coefficient on the size variable exhibits a positive sign which is 
consistent with Milkove and Weisblat's empirical results and Stigum and 
Branch's (1983) observation that small banks tend to be "deposit rich" 
relative to demand for their loans. Numerical values of coefficients 
measure the change in the loan to asset ratio that would result from a 
$1,000 increase in total assets. For example. Equation 1 in Table 1 
indicates that the loan to asset ratio increases by .019 for every $10 
million increase in total assets. Values from other equations range 
from a low of .015 in 1978 to a high of .024 in 1976. These numbers 
compare favorably to the .016 figure derived from Milkove and 
Weisblat's equation which was estimated with 1977 data. 
Statistics for the retail sales variable = % change in 
county retail sales from 1971 to 1976; = % change in county retail 
sales from 1973 to 1978) are consistent with previous expectations. In 
1976, the variable is statistically significant at either the .05 level 
or the .01 level, and in 1978, the variable is statistically significant 
at the .01 level in all equations. The positive sign on the variable's 
coefficient indicates that loans increase relative to other assets as 
retail sales growth increases. According to Equation 1 in Table 1, a 
ten percent increase in retail sales will cause the loan to asset ratio 
to rise by .015. Equation 1 in Table 2 indicates that a ten percent 
increase in retail sales will result in an increase of .027 for the loan 
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to asset ratio. The link between retail sales growth and loan volume 
appears to have been stronger in the 1978 equations. 
The government deposit variable (G = $1,000 of government deposits) 
was included in the model to control for the effects of pledging 
requirements on bank asset portfolios. The variable was found to be 
statistically insignificant in all equations which is not surprising 
since state and local government deposits in Iowa are secured by a state 
administered sinking fund (Ratti, 1979b, p. 17). The unanticipated sign 
on the government deposit coefficient appears to have arisen .from 
relatively high correlation between firm size and dollar volume of 
government deposits (R = .69). If government deposits are deflated by 
total deposits, the sign on the coefficient is reversed but the variable 
remains statistically insignificant. 
The management ability variable ( X= ratio of assets to employees) 
is statistically significant at the .05 level in the relevant 1976 
equations and statistically significant at the .10 level in the relevant 
1978 equations. Numbers in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that a one million 
dollar increase in the ratio of assets to employees (management ability) 
would result in decreases of approximately .04 (1976) and .03 (1978) in 
the ratio of loans to total assets. The smaller change in 1978 likely 
reflects an increase in the general price level between 1976 and 1978; 
one million dollars In 1978 was not equivalent to one million dollars in 
1976. 
The negative sign on the management ability variable 
coefficient is consistent with observations of low loan to total asset 
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ratios at high profit banks. Recognition of the fact that the 
coefficient on the management ability variable is a partial derivative 
gives rise to a slightly different but more theoretically appealing 
interpretation of the observed sign. If firm size (total assets) is 
held constant and management ability increases, optimization would 
likely lead to a reduction in the number of employees. Because loan 
services are relatively expensive to produce (Wall, 1983b, p. 14) and 
labor intensive at agricultural banks, management could be expected to 
economize on employee time by reducing the volume of loans relative to 
other assets. If all variables, including firm size, were allowed to 
vary simultaneously, changes in management ability would impact the loan 
to asset ratio directly through the management ability variable and 
indirectly through the market structure and firm size variables. 
Federal Reserve membership (FR = 1 for members; 0 for nonmembers) 
was found to be a highly significant determinant of loan to asset ratios 
at agricultural banks indicating that reserve requirements were a 
binding constraint for those banks in 1976 and 1978. The sign on the 
membership variable is negative which implies that member banks were 
forced to substitute primary reserves for loans. According to numbers 
in Table 1, loan to asset ratios at member banks were lower than loan to 
asset ratios at nonmember banks by as much as .061 in 1976. Table 2 
shows that the difference was approximately .048 in 1978. 
A second binary variable, the multi-bank holding company affiliate 
variable (HC = 1 for affiliate; 0 for nonaffiliate), was statistically 
insignificant in all equations. This result may be due to the fact that 
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only 23 (5%) of the 444 banks in the data set were multi-bank holding 
company affiliates as of 1974, or it may simply reflect the 
indeterminacy of past holding company studies (Brown, 1983). The sign 
on the variable coefficient in all equations is positive and consistent 
with holding company studies that did reveal a statistically significant 
relationship between affiliation and loan to asset ratios (see Brown 
(1983) for a tabulated summary of 11 bank holding company performance 
studies). 
The final set of variables (PCA^ ; i = 1, ..., 15) was included in 
the model to account for the impact of PCAs on agricultural bank 
performance. A perusal of Tables 1 and 2 will show that PCA variables 
were generally insignificant in 1976 and 1978 and did not add 
significant information to the model. In light of these results, it is 
a possibility that the model as specified does not utilize all available 
information about PCAs in the data set. The model is based on the 
assumption that loan to asset ratios rather than slope coefficients on 
market concentration variables differ among PCA districts. A different 
specification of the model may give different statistical results. 
Analysis of regression statistics; ratio of loans to total assets 
A notable result displayed in Tables 1 and 2 is the general 
insignificance of market structure variables (Hf, Sh). This lack of 
significance may be attributed to a) lack of variability of the loan to 
asset ratio in the data set, b) the possibility that market 
concentration simply does not influence relative loan volumes at 
agricultural banks, c) improper market delineation, or d) the 
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possibility that all available information about slope coefficients in 
the data set is not being utilized. 
Milkove and Weisblat's (1982) study provides some support for the 
first potential explanation of statistical insignificance. In that 
study, the researchers found that the county Herfindahl index was a 
27 
significant predictor of loan to deposit ratios when data were 
aggregated over five states. However, when equations were estimated by 
state, only one state, Texas, exhibited a statistically significant 
Herfindahl index. It may be that single states do not provide 
sufficient variability of loan to asset ratios to allow the Herfindahl 
index or the market share variable to be statistically significant. 
This explanation is tempered somewhat by the fact that a number of other 
independent variables were statistically significant in the loan 
equations. 
Regarding the second potential explanation, it seems unreasonable 
to assume that loan demand function parameters, hence, loan to asset 
ratios do not vary among markets. On the other hand, it is possible 
that market structure is overwhelmed by other explanatory variables when 
equations are estimated using individual banks rather than individual 
banks aggregated over markets. For example, firm size, management 
ability, and Federal Reserve membership may be dominating factors as 
indicated by numbers in Tables 1 and 2. 
27 To determine if statistical results were sensitive to choice of 
loan ratio, both the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of 
loans to total deposits were regressed on independent variables in Table 
1. Not surprisingly, the results were very similar. 
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On the surface, the third potential explanation appears to be 
discredited by results of deposit ratio analyses shown in Tables 4 and 
5. In all deposit equations, both the Herfindahl index and the market 
share variable were significantly different from zero at the .01 level. 
One might reasonably argue that both loan markets and deposit markets 
tend to be local for agricultural banks, hence, market delineations that 
explain deposit ratios should also explain loan ratios. This argument 
ignores the potential impact of PCA competition, however. Recall that 
Herfindahl indices and market share variables do not account for PCAs in 
any way, principally because PCA districts are regional in nature and 
encompass multiple banking markets. Banking markets as delineated may 
be improper for explaining loan ratios at agricultural banks if only 
because they ignore the potential impact of PCA competition. 
The fourth proposed explanation of statistical insignificance is 
closely related to the third. As noted above, all information about PCA 
competition in the data set may not be utilized when the loan equation 
is estimated as originally specified. PCA qualitative variables may 
contain ungamered information pertaining to the relationship between loan 
to asset ratios and market Herfindahl indices. A reasonable alternative 
specification would allow for the possibility that slope coefficients on 
the Herfindahl index vary among PCA districts. 
In order to determine the sensitivity of statistical results to 
specification of PCA competition, all 12 loan equations were reestimated 
using an alternative specification. PCA binary variables were 
multiplied by Herfindahl indices (PCA_ x Hf; i=l, ..., 15), and these 
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newly created variables replaced binary variables in estimated 
equations. In the original specification, PCAs were assumed to shift 
the intercept of the loan equation. In the alternative specification, 
PCAs were assumed to affect the Herfindahl index slope coefficient (see 
Kmenta, 1971, pp. 422-423). 
Representative statistical results for reestimated equations are 
shown in Table 3 (not all reestimated equations are tabulated because 
results and implications are consistent across equations). For 
convenience of comparison, statistics from the alternative specification 
are exhibited alongside statistics from the original specification. 
Similar to PCA variables in the model as originally specified, PCA 
variables in the alternative specification did not add significant 
information to the model. In 1976, t-statistics indicated that no PCA 
variable was statistically significant under either specification. In 
1978, five PCA variables exhibited statistical significance (four at the 
.10 level) under the alternative specification compared to only one 
under the original specification, but an F-statistic (Kmenta, 1971, p. 
370) indicated that all PCA slope variables taken together did not add 
2 
significant information to the model. Values of R shown at the bottom 
of Table 3 indicate that explanatory power differs little between 
specifications. 
With the exception of Herfindahl index coefficients, coefficients 
on non-PCA variables differed little between specifications. 
Coefficients on the Herfindahl index differed between specifications 
because those coefficients represented different phenomena under 
alternative specifications. Under the original specification, the 
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Table 3. Comparison of original and alternative PCA specifications: 
ratio of loans to total assets for 1976 and 1978^  
Variable Equation 
Intercept .539*** 
(17.11) 
.553*** 
(19.80) 
.593*** 
(20.09) 
.613*** 
(23.13) 
Hf -.098 
(-.98) 
-.230 
(-1.56) 
-.183* 
(-1.91) 
—•368** 
(-2.57) 
Sh .088 
(1.35) 
.083 
(1 .26)  
.061 
(.99) 
.060 
(.96) 
Si 2.444E-06*** 
(3.10) 
2.301E-06*** 
(2.92) 
1.865E-06*** 
(2.89) 
1.809E-06*** 
(2.80) 
1.583E-03*** 
(2.65) 
1.610E-03*** 
(2.69) 
2.871E-03*** 
(4.92) 
2.940E-03*** 
(5.07) 
2.059E-04 
(1.32) 
2.074E-04 
(1.33) 
1.181E-04 
(1.34) 
1.117E-04 
(1.27) 
-4.192E-05** 
(-2.06) 
-3.836E-05* 
(-1.88) 
-2.792E-05* 
(-1.79) 
-2.683E-05* 
(-1.71) 
FR —.060*** 
(-4.06) 
-.059*** 
(-3.99) 
—.048*** 
(-3.46) 
-.047*** 
(-3.39) 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans in all 
equations. 
O^riginal specification, 1976. 
A^lternative specification, 1976. 
O^riginal specification, 1978. 
A^lternative specification, 1978. 
* ** *** 
Significant at .10 level, .05 level, and .01 level, 
respectively. 
Table 3. (continued) 
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Equation 
Variable 
1^  2^  3^  4® 
HC .027 
(.85) 
.007 
(.24) 
.018 
(.69) 
.018 
(.58) 
.055 
(1.42) 
.043 
(1.28) 
.002 
(.08) 
.028 
(.94) 
.024 
( .86) 
-.025 
(-.91) 
.015 
(.45) 
-.021 
(-.74) 
.025 
(.77) 
.111 
(.72) 
.135 
( .86)  
.111 
(.82) 
.221 
(1.56) 
.225 
(1.26) 
.060 
(.37) 
.150 
(1.00) 
.133 
(.96) 
- .126 
(-.73) 
.196 
(1.39) 
-.035 
(-.20) 
.025 
(1.01) 
.006 
( .22) 
.012 
(.51) 
.023 
(.79) 
.039 
(1.07) 
.034 
(1.09) 
-.003 
( - .12)  
.046* 
(1.67) 
.035 
(1.34) 
- .010 
(-.37) 
.033 
(1.07) 
- .011 
(-.43) 
.026 
(1.06) 
.136 
(.91) 
.147 
(.99) 
.188 
(1.41) 
.235* 
(1.70) 
.217 
(1.27) 
.040 
( .26)  
.296** 
(1.99) 
.227* 
(1 .68)  
-.002 
( - .01)  
.241* 
(1.71) 
.012 
(.07) 
D^^ =PCA^  in Equations 1 and 3; D^ =PCA^ xHf in Equations 2 and 4. 
Table 3. (contiaued) 
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Equation 
Variable 
2^  3^  4* 
.008 .059 .007 .096 
(.28) (.33) (.28) (.56) 
-.002 .003 -.006 -.003 
(-.05) (.01) (-.19) (-.01) 
.022 .241 .017 .261* 
(.69) (1.61) (.57) (1.88) 
.022 .188 .015 .179 
(.80) (1.28) (.61) (1.23) 
.1279 .1266 .1564 .1571 
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coefficient on the Herfindahl index represented a slope common to all 
banks. Under the alternative specification, the coefficient on the 
Herfindahl index represented a slope common to banks in the omitted FCÂ 
district only. Coefficients on PCA variables differed between 
specifications because numerical values of variables differed. 
In summary, F-statistics indicate that PCA variables did not add 
significant information to the model under either specification. 
Numbers in Table 3 also indicate that the change in specification did 
not greatly influence the coefficients on other explanatory variables. 
Hypothesis tests 
The hypothesis introduced in Chapter I was fairly general and not 
stated in an explicitly testable form. A testable form of the 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H^ : When information about management is introduced into the 
regression model, estimated slope coefficients on market 
structure variables decrease in magnitude. 
If slope coefficients on structure variables increase in absolute value 
or remain unchanged, the hypothesis is rejected. Clearly, quantitative 
changes in coefficients are less meaningful when coefficients are not 
statistically significant, therefore terminology distinguishes between 
situations in which coefficients are statistically significant and 
situations in which coefficients are not statistically significant. If 
the hypothesis is rejected and coefficients are statistically 
significant, the hypothesis is said to be strongly rejected. 
Alternatively, if the hypothesis is rejected and coefficients are 
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statistically insignificant, the hypothesis is said to be weakly 
rejected. 
According to Tables 1 and 2, the absolute values of Herfindahl 
index coefficients and market share variable coefficients increased in 
all equations when the management ability variable was added to the 
model. Magnitudes of change in 1976 Herfindahl index coefficients 
ranged from 51% (-.065 to -.098) to 133% (-.021 to -.049), and 
magnitudes of change in 1976 market share variable coefficients ranged 
from 22% (.072 to .088) to 27% (.049 to .062). Neither variable was 
statistically significant in 1976 regardless of the presence or absence 
of the management ability variable. Magnitudes of change in 1978 
Herfindahl index coefficients were approximately 16% (e.g., -.158 to 
-.183) across all equations, and magnitudes of change in 1978 market 
share variable coefficients were approximately 30% (e.g., .047 to .061) 
across all equations. The Herfindahl index was statistically 
significant in all 1978 equations that contained the management ability 
variable, while the market share variable was statistically 
insignificant in all 1978 equations. Results indicate that the 
hypothesis should be strongly rejected for the 1978 Herfindahl index and 
weakly rejected for the 1976 Herfindahl index, the 1976 market share 
variable, and the 1978 market share variable. 
Outcomes of hypothesis tests weakly imply that the strength of the 
relationship between market structure and the loan to asset ratio is 
understated when information about management ability is excluded from 
the model. Apparently, the management ability variable is a relevant 
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explanatory variable, and exclusion of the variable from the model leads 
to biased coefficients on the Herfindahl index and the market share 
variable. When such a specification error occurs, included explanatory 
variables tend to pick up information about relationships between 
excluded explanatory variables and the dependent variable. Only in the 
unlikely event that the management ability variable is uncorrelated 
with a linear combination of other right hand side variables would 
regression coefficients be unaffected by the absence of the management 
ability variable (see Kmenta, 1971, pp. 392-395). 
Summary of regression statistics; ratio of time and savings deposits to 
total deposits 
Estimated statistics for the 12 deposit equations are shown in 
2 Tables 4 and 5. R s shown at the bottom of the tables are generally 
higher than those associated with loan equations indicating superior 
explanatory power. F-statistics for all equations are significant at 
the .01 level. 
Much like results for the loan equations, all deposit equation 
intercept terms were significantly different from zero. Unlike results 
for the loan equations, Herfindahl indices and market share variables 
were statistically significant at the .01 level in all deposit 
equations. Signs on market structure variables were unchanged from loan 
equations indicating that the unexpected sign on the market share 
variable cannot be summarily dismissed because of statistical 
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28 insignificance of the variable. Although coefficients on structure 
variables increased numerically when nonbank institutions were accounted 
for, there was no statistical evidence that savings and loans and credit 
unions added significant information to the model. 
The size variable provided interesting results that were invariant 
across years. The coefficient on the size variable was statistically 
significant at the .01 level in all equations that excluded the 
management ability variable but statistically insignificant in all 
equations that included the management ability variable. Apparently the 
size variable was picking up information about the relationship between 
loan to asset ratios and management ability in the absence of the 
management variable. This observation is consistent with Oi's theorized 
direct relationship between firm size and management ability (for non-
SMSA Iowa agricultural banks, the correlation between management ability 
and firm size was approximately .30). The sign on the size variable 
coefficient was found to be positive in both equations which is 
consistent with Milkove and Weisblat's empirical results. 
Statistical results for the retail sales variable were quite mixed 
between years. In 1976, the retail sales variable was statistically 
insignificant in all equations, while in 1978, it was statistically 
significant in all equations. Recall that results for the retail sales 
variable differed between years in loan equations although the variation 
was much less pronounced. Differences in statistical results between 
Possible explanations for the observed sign on the market share 
variable coefficient are explored in the analysis section. 
Table 4. Estimated regression coefficients and t-statlstlcs: ratio of time and savings deposits 
to total deposits for 1976 
Variable Equation 
la 2^  3^  4^  6% 
Intercept 
Hf 
Sh 
Si 
R 
FR 
HC 
PCA, 
.728*** 
(45.01) 
-.202*** 
(-3.55) 
.149*** 
(3.81) 
1.536E-06*** 
(3.84) 
4.339E-04 
(1.08) 
-.006 
(-.56) 
-.005 
(-.23) 
-.025 
(-1.33) 
.636*** 
(31.31) 
-.144*** 
(-2.64) 
.123*** 
(3.30) 
5.309E-07 
(1.31) 
2.979E-04 
(.78) 
8.985E-05*** 
(6.95) 
-.006 
(-.65) 
.021 
(1.04) 
-.015 
(-.85) 
.735*** 
(46.25) 
-.296*** 
(-4.48) 
.192*** 
(4.43) 
1.524E-06*** 
(3.85) 
5.021E-04 
(1.26) 
-.005 
(-.55) 
-.007 
(-.33) 
-.024 
(-1.27) 
.645*** 
(32.20) 
-.229*** 
(-3.61) 
.162*** 
(3.91) 
5.431E-07 
(1.35) 
3.520E-04 
(.93) 
8.774E-05*** 
(6.83) 
- .006 
(-.64) 
.019 
(.92) 
-.014 
(-.81) 
.735*** 
(46.41) 
-.299*** 
(-4.49) 
.194*** 
(4.45) 
1.525E-06*** 
(3.85) 
4.984E-04 
(1.25) 
-.005 
(-.55) 
-.007 
(-.35) 
-.024 
(-1.26) 
.645*** 
(32.29) 
-.232*** 
(-3.63) 
.164*** 
(3.93) 
5.437E-07 
(1.35) 
3.497E-04 
(.92) 
8.772E-05*** 
(6.83) 
-.006 
(-.64) 
.018 
(.91) 
-.014 
(- .80) 
PCAg 
PCA3 
PCA^  
PCAG 
PCAg 
PCAy 
PCAg 
-.011 -.001 -.012 -.003 -.012 -.003 
(-.62) (-.08) (-.69) (-.16) (-.69) (-.16) 
-.033 -.036* -.031 -.034* -.030 -.033* 
(-1.60) (-1.85) (-1.48) (-1.73) (-1.46) (-1.71) 
-.017 -.015 -.012 -.009 -.012 -.009 
(-.66) (-.60) (-.48) (-.39) (-.46) (-.37) 
-.017 -.021 -.015 -.019 -.014 -.018 
(-.77) (-.98) (-.65) (-.88) (-.63) (-.86) 
-.029 -.021 -.030 -.022 -.029 -.022 
(-1.56) (-1.17) (-1.61) (-1.24) (-1.59) (-1.22) 
-.026 -.018 -.016 -.010 -.016 -.010 
(-1.32) (-.95) (-.81) (-.53) (-.81) (-.53) 
-.071*** -.066*** -.070*** -.066*** -.070*** -.065*** 
(-3.77) (-3.71) (-3.78) (-3.70) (-3.77) (-3.70) 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks only. 
and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans. 
H^f and Sh calculated using banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. 
*Signifleant at .10 level. 
^^ Significant at .05 level. 
***Slgnlfleant at .01 level. 
Table 4. (continued) 
Equation 
Variable 
1® 2® 3^  4^  5^  6^ 
PCAg -.035* 
(-1.87) 
-.034* 
(-1.88) 
-.036* 
(-1.92) 
-.035* 
(-1.94) 
-.036* 
(-1.90) 
-.034* 
(-1.93) 
PCAlo -.030 (-1.31) 
-.027 
(-1.24) 
-.027 
(-1.20) 
-.024 
(-1.12) 
-.027 
(-1.19) 
-.024 
(-1.11) 
PCA^i -.050*** 
(-2.62) 
-.038** 
(-2.10) 
-.049*** 
(-2.62) 
-.038** 
(-2.13) 
-.049*** 
(-2.59) 
-.038** 
(-2.11) 
PCAi, -.027 
(-1.46) 
-.025 
(-1.45) 
-.029 
(-1.59) 
-.027 
(-1.59) 
-.028 
(-1.57) 
-.027 
(-1.57) 
PCAi, -.026 (-1.14) 
-.021 
(-.96) 
-.028 
(-1.26) 
-.023 
(-1.08) 
-.028 
(-1.25) 
-.023 
(-1.07) 
PCAJ 4  -.043** (-2.03) 
-.032 
(-1.59) 
-.040* 
(-1.88) 
-.029 
(-1.47) 
-.039* 
(-1.87) 
-.029 
(-1.46) 
PCA^ 5  -.025 
(-1.34) 
-.023 
(-1.32) 
-.025 
(-1.36) 
-.023 
(-1.33) 
-.024 
(-1.35) 
-.023 
(-1.33) 
R 
N 
K 
.1303 
444 
22 
.2198 
444 
23 
.1452 
444 
22 
.2305 
444 
23 
.1456 
444 
22 
.2308 
444 
23 
Table 5. Estimated regression coefficients and t-statlatlcs: ratio of time and savings deposits 
to total deposits for 1978 
Variable Equation 
1* 2* 3b 4k 5= 6= 
Intercept .756*** 
(51.58) 
,672*** 
(35.73) 
.762*** 
(52.64) 
.679*** 
(36.47) 
.761*** 
(52.80) 
.679*** 
(36.55) 
Hf -.194*** 
(-3.74) 
-.147*** 
(-2.95) 
-.284*** 
(-4.54) 
-.228*** 
(-3.78) 
-.286*** 
(-4.55) 
-.230*** 
(-3.79) 
Sh .126*** 
(3.55) 
.097*** 
(2.86) 
.161*** 
(4.09) 
.132*** 
(3.42) 
.166*** 
(4.10) 
.134*** 
(3.43) 
SI 1.065E-06*** 
(3.53) 
4.406E-07 
(1.46) 
1.064E-06*** 
(3.56) 
4.478E-07 
(1.49) 
1.065E-06*** 
(3.56) 
4.489E-07 
(1.50) 
R 9.196E-04** 
(2.39) 
6.749E-04* 
(1.76) 
1.009E-03*** 
(2.63) 
7.257E-04** 
(1.98) 
l.OllE-03*** 
(2.64) 
7.277E-04** 
(1.98) 
X 6.611E-05*** 
(6.68) 
6.491E-05*** 
(6.61) 
6.491E-05**' 
(6.61) 
FR -.005 
(-.55) 
-.006 
(-.63) 
-.005 
(-.54) 
-.005 
(-.62) 
-.005 
(-.54) 
-.005 
(-.62) 
HC -.005 
(-.31) 
.012 
(.76) 
-.006 
(-.36) 
.011 
(.71) 
-.006 
(-.38) 
.011 
(.70) 
PCAj 0.026 
(-1.51) 
-.025 
(-1.51) 
-.024 
(-1.42) 
-.023 
(-1.43) 
-.024 
(-1.41) 
-.023 
(-1.42) 
PCAg -.014 
(-.85) 
-.011 
(-.74) 
-.014 
(-.87) 
-.011 
(-.76) 
-.014 
(-.87) 
-.011 
(-.76) 
PCAg -.027 (-1.39) 
-.033* 
(-1.79) 
-.024 
(-1.23) 
-.030 
(-1.63) 
-.023 
(-1.20) 
-.029 
(-1.60) 
PCA^ -.018 
(-.73) 
-.012 
(-.51) 
-.013 
(-.53) 
-.007 
(-.30) 
-.012 
(-.51) 
-.006 
(-.28) 
PCAg -.014 (-.65) 
-.017 
(-.84) 
-.011 
(-.51) 
-.014 
(-.71) 
-.010 
(-.49) 
-.014 
(-.70) 
PCAg -.027 (-1.55) 
-.020 
(-1.21) 
-.026 
(-1.54) 
-.020 
(-1.21) 
-.026 
(-1.53) 
-.020 
(-1.20) 
PCAy -.020 (-1.11) 
-.013 
(-.75) 
-.012 
(-.65) 
-.006 
(-.37) 
-.012 
(-.65) 
-.006 
(-.37) 
PCAg -.065*** (-3.77) 
-.059*** 
(-3.57) 
—.064*** 
(-3.75) 
-.058*** 
(-3.54) 
—,064*** 
(-3.74) 
-.058*** 
(-3.53) 
and Sh calculated using banks only. 
and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans. 
and Sh calculated using banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. 
S^ignificant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
Table 5. (continued) 
Variable 
1° 2° S*" 4'' 5° 6° 
PCA, 
PCA 10 
PCA 11 
PCA 12 
PCA 13 
PCA 14 
PCA 15 
-.036** -.038** -.035** -.037** -.035** -.037** 
(-2.06) (-2.27) (-2.03) (-2.26) (-2.02) (-2.25) 
-.030 -.025 -.030 -.025 -.030 -.024 
(-1.42) (-1.24) (-1.46) (-1.25) (-1.45) (-1.24) 
-.046*** -.038** -.046*** -.038** -.045*** -.038** 
(-2.62) (-2.27) (-2.62) (-2.29) (-2.60) (-2.27) 
-.026 -.030* -.028* -.032** -.028* -.031** 
(-1.56) (-1.87) (-1.68) (-1.99) (-1.67) (-1.98) 
-.014 -.014 -.016 -.015 -.015 -.015 
(-.66) (-.68) (-.75) (-.76) (-.74) (-.75) 
-.033* -.025 -.028 -.020 -.028 -.020 
(-1.70) (-1.32) (-1.44) (-1.09) (-1.44) (-1.09) 
-.026 -.030* -.027 -.030* -.027 -.030* 
(-1.57) (-1.86) (-1.61) (-1.90) (-1.61) (-1.90) 
R 
N 
K 
.1309 
444 
22 
.2141 
444 
23 
.1444 
444 
22 
.2247 
444 
23 
.1445 
444 
22  
.2249 
444 
23 
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years may indicate that retail sales growth as measured is not a 
consistently good indicator of economic activity as it affects bank 
performance. The five year time periods used to calculate changes in 
retail sales may be too long. Variability of statistical results also 
existed within years. In 1978 equations, levels of significance ranged 
from .01 to .10, and coefficients differed somewhat in terms of 
magnitude. Finally, the retail sales variables exhibited the expected 
positive sign indicating that increased retail sales growth is 
associated with larger ratios of time and savings deposits to total 
deposits. 
Tables 4 and 5 show that the management ability variable was highly 
significant in all relevant equations. At first glance, the positive 
sign exhibited on all management ability coefficients may appear to be 
in conflict with results of high profit bank studies which indicated 
that high profit banks tend to have low ratios of time and savings 
deposits to total deposits. However, an explanation similar to the one 
proposed for loan equations makes the results appear less perverse. To 
repeat, if management ability increases while all other variables 
including firm size are held constant, optimization would likely lead to 
a reduction in the number of employees. Given that demand deposit 
29 
services are more costly to produce (Wall, 1983b, p. 16) and more 
Wall's working paper actually states that demand deposits are 
less expensive to service than time and savings deposits which is 
incorrect. The correct cost relationship is described in a related 
article written by Wall (1983a). 
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labor intensive than time and savings deposit services, management may 
economize oa employee time by reducing the volume of demand deposits 
(increasing the volume of time and savings deposits) relative to other 
types of deposits. If all variables were allowed to change 
simultaneously, changes in management ability would theoretically affect 
the time and savings deposits ratio indirectly through the firm size and 
market structure variables. 
Neither the Federal Reserve membership variable nor the multi-bank 
holding company affiliation variable revealed statistical significance. 
The insignificance of the membership variable is not unexpected since 
reserve requirement constraints reasonably have a stronger impact on the 
asset side of the balance sheet than on the liability side of the 
balance sheet. Previous explanations for insignificance of the 
affiliation variable in loan equations apply as well to deposit 
equations. 
Although some coefficients on PCA variables were statistically 
significant according to computed t-statistics, F-statistics (Kmenta, 
1971, p. 370) indicate that all PCA variables taken together did not add 
significant information to the model in either year. In other words, 
the hypothesis that coefficients on all 15 PCA variables were jointly 
equal to zero could not be rejected at the .01 level of significance. 
Further investigation of the importance of PCAs to agricultural bank 
performance is described in the analysis section which follows. 
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29 
where the elements of the diagonal matrix D are singular values of X. 
For purposes of detecting collinearity, singular value decomposition 
provides information that is superior to information about the 
eigensystem of X'X (see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980, p. 99). 
Singular values that are small relative to the maximum singular 
value of X are indicative of near linear dependencies among two or more 
columns of X. Smallness of singular values is measured by a condition 
index: 
= ^ max/^ k ° 
where is the condition index and the |l's represent singular values. 
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch state that condition indices with values from 
five to ten are associated with weak linear dependencies and condition 
indices with values from 30 to 100 are associated with moderate to 
strong linear dependencies. 
30 Matrices containing scaled data for 1976 and 1978 were decomposed 
using singular value decomposition. Singular values and associated 
condition indices are shown in Table 6. Note that in each year, three 
condition indices reflect weak dependencies, and one condition index 
29 Statistical Analysis System (SAS) provides for singular value 
decomposition in its matrix procedure. 
30 Scaling involves deflating each observation in column k of X by 
the square root of the sum of squares of column k. 
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Analysis of regression statistics; ratio of time and savings deposits 
to total deposits 
In all deposit equations, market structure variables were highly 
significant. Herfindahl index coefficients displayed the expected 
negative sign, but market share variable coefficients displayed a 
positive sign contrary to the findings of Rhoades (1984). Rhoades had 
predicted that bank performance models which contained both a market 
concentration variable and a market share variable would suffer from 
multicollinearity (collinearity), and certainly collinearity could have 
confounded statistical results in this study. Correlations between 
Herfindahl indices and market share variables were found to range from 
.665 to .685. On the other hand, correlations of the magnitude found in 
this study are necessary but not sufficient for a collinearity problem, 
and there may be a logical explanation for the observed sign on market 
share variable coefficients. Determination of the appropriateness of 
the observed sign unquestionably requires further analysis. 
Test for damaging collinearity Most proposed methods for 
detecting the existence of near collinearity in a data matrix suffer 
from statistical shortcomings (Fomby, Hill, and Johnson, 1984; Johnston, 
1984; Judge, Griffiths, Hill, and Lee, 1980). One method that appears 
to mitigate the shortcomings associated with other detection methods is 
singular value decomposition (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). Singular 
value decomposition is a mathematical procedure that decomposes the X 
matrix of predetermined variables into the form: 
X = UDV 
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Table 6. Singular values and condition indices from singular value 
decomposition, 1976 and 1978 
1976 1978 
1 2.352 1.000 2.339 1.000 
2 .145 16.186 .144 16.202 
3 .282 8.350 .532 4.392 
4 .265 8.877 .467 5.007 
5 .464 5.065 .275 8.506 
6 .537 4.383 .265 8.824 
7 .832 2.827 .829 2.820 
8 .893 2.633 1.107 2.113 
9 1.102 2.324 1.084 2.158 
10 1.067 2.205 .908 2.577 
11 .939 2.505 .916 2.552 
12 1.018 2.312 1.035 2.260 
13 1.013 2.323 1.104 2.306 
14 1.002 2.346 1.003 2.331 
15 1.001 2.349 1.002 2.334 
16 1.000 2.351 1.000 2.338 
17 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
18 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
19 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
20 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
21 • 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
22 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
23 1.000 2.352 1.000 2.339 
C^ondition indices were calculated before singular values were 
rounded. 
Ill 
reflects a dependency somewhere between weak and moderate. Dependencies 
associated with condition indices between five and ten generally are not 
damaging to regression estimates. Dependencies associated with larger 
condition indices may or may not be damaging to regression estimates. 
Singular values and information from the V matrix can be combined 
to compute variance-decomposition proportions (see Belsley, Kuh, and 
Welsch, 1980, pp. 106-107). Variance-decomposition proportions are 
helpful in determining which variables are and which variables are not 
involved in linear dependencies. If two or more large variance-
decomposition proportions (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch recommend a cutoff 
value of .5) exist within a high condition index column, then the 
variables associated with large variance-decomposition proportions are 
quite likely involved in a damaging linear dependency. 
Table 7 exhibits those variance-decomposition proportions that are 
associated with the three largest condition indices in each year. 
Columns one (y^ j 1976) and four (^ g, 1978) are of interest because the 
condition indices associated with those columns exceed ten, indicating 
potentially damaging collinearity. The remaining columns were included 
because they provide interesting information about key variables. 
The information in columns one and four appears to be quite 
consistent between years. The columns reveal that two variance-
decomposition proportions, those associated with the intercept and the 
management ability variable, exceed .5 indicating that those items may 
be involved in a near linear dependency. A third item, the Herfindahl 
index, could be weakly involved. 
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Table 7, Variance-decomposition proportions associated with larger 
condition indices 
Variable 2^ 4 < 
Intercept .974 .009 .002 .972 .012 .001 
Hf .290 .002 .681 .264 .002 .710 
Sh .078 .002 .408 .080 .000 .384 
Si .015 .151 .044 .011 .100 .039 
R .001 .010 .000 .006 .017 .003 
X .530 .390 .059 .566 .350 .067 
FR .001 .012 .000 .001 .009 .001 
HC .019 .025 .005 .017 .014 .006 
Fl .144 .203 .089 .099 .275 .068 
P2 .192 .249 .088 .145 .322 .067 
P3 .045 .217 .111 .031 .255 .102 
.017 .107 .136 .017 .107 .144 
F5 .056 .195 .071 .051 .207 .059 
6^ .164 .231 .056 .146 .254 .049 
.089 .187 .137 -088 .218 .114 
8^ .110 .241 .114 .112 .251 .104 
9^ .135 .263 .043 .106 .306 .034 
PlO .039 .146 .126 .050 .160 .097 
?li .165 .196 .061 .149 .238 .045 
1^2 .163 .285 .025 .125 .343 .013 
3^ .115 .171 .030 .091 .206 .022 
Pl4 .089 .147 .117 .064 .163 .140 
fl5 .126 .277 .076 .097 .337 .053 
*1976. 
1^978. 
113 
The role of the constant term in linear dependencies is often 
overlooked by researchers (except, of course, in those cases where 
failure to exclude a binary variable from a model with a constant term 
leads to perfect collinearity), but Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch have shown 
that constant terms may indeed be involved in damaging linear 
dependencies. One would not logically anticipate a linear dependency 
between the constant term and the management ability variable, but a 
perusal of the data set utilized in this study shows that measures of 
management ability tend to be centered around a value of 1000. Observed 
values of management ability, therefore, are roughly equal to the 
constant term multiplied by 1000. 
More important than the numbers just discussed, of course, is the 
damage to estimated regression coefficients caused by linear 
dependencies. Fortunately, all available evidence indicates that the 
linear dependency between the constant term and the management ability 
variable is not highly consequential. First, the condition indices 
associated with the dependency between the constant term and the 
management ability variable are not extremely large (16.186 in 1976 and 
16.202 in 1978). Recall Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch's statement that 
moderate to strong dependencies are associated with condition indices 
between 30 and 100. Second, the management ability variable is highly 
significant in all deposit equations. A common consequence of strong 
collinearities is large estimated variances, hence, small t-statistics. 
Third, because the management ability variable is related to the constant 
term rather than another independent variable, there should be no 
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confounding of information in the management ability variable slope 
coefficient. Stated another way, the coefficient on the management 
ability variable should not contain inseparable information about two or 
more right hand side variables. 
Information from columns two and five of Table 7 essentially 
confirms previous conclusions about the existence of a linear dependency 
between the management ability variable and the constant term. Although 
no variance-decomposition proportion exceeds .5 in columns two and five, 
the largest proportions are associated with the management ability 
variable and a number of PCA binary variables. A linear dependency 
among those particular variables is not surprising given that there 
exists a dependency between the management ability variable and 
the intercept term. A column vector representing the sum of all PCA 
variable column vectors would closely resemble a column of ones not 
unlike the column of ones representing the constant term. 
Columns three and six of Table 7 present information that is 
relevant to the key issue introduced at the beginning of this section, 
namely the possibility of a damaging linear dependency between the 
Herfindahl index and the market share variable. The bulk of available 
evidence indicates that although there is a linear relationship between 
the two variables, the dependency is not likely to be damaging to 
regression estimates. As shown xn Table 6, the condition indices 
associated with the dependency between the Herfindahl index and the 
market share variable are relatively small (8.877 in 1976 and 8.824 in 
1978) indicating a weak dependency. In addition, only one variance-
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decomposition proportion, that associated with the Herfindahl index, 
exceeds .5 in either year (Table 7). It does not appear, then, that the 
unexpected sign on market share variable coefficients in deposit 
equations is a consequence of collinearity between variables. 
Given the lack of evidence for damaging collinearity, other factors 
must explain the observed sign on the market share variable. Three 
possibilities exist: a) the empirical results are unique to the data 
set utilized in this study, b) the expectation that market share is 
inversely related to the deposit ratio is unfounded, or c) the 
coefficient on the market share variable is biased due to specification 
error. 
The first explanation is related to the possibility that the 444 
agricultural banks utilized in this study are not representative of 
other agricultural banks in the U.S. Recall from the first section of 
this chapter, however, that key operating ratios at profitable Iowa 
agricultural banks were not markedly different from operating ratios at 
profitable commercial banks nationwide. The question of adequacy of the 
data set is ultimately an empirical question which can be answered only 
by adding additional observations to the data set. 
The second explanation is based upon the fact that even though low 
deposit ratios were found to be associated with high rates of return in 
the ABA-FDIC studies, deposit ratios and rates of return are not 
equivalent measures of bank performance. Indeed, there is no 
theoretical basis for the expectation that market share and the ratio 
of time and savings deposits to total deposits are inversely related. 
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The only existing empirical evidence for such a relationship is the 
indirect evidence provided by Rhoades* (1984) study wherein market share 
was found to be directly related to return on assets. The question of 
direction of causality between market share and the deposit ratio would 
best be answered by refining the theoretical model which was developed 
in Chapter III. Unfortunately, that appears to be a burdensome task due 
to the large number of choice variables involved. An alternative 
approach would be to expand the number of observations in the data set 
and note any changes in the sign on the market share variable 
coefficient. 
The third explanation reflects the fact that neither the 
theoretical model derived in this study nor previously derived economic 
theory provides guidelines for incorporating the Herfindahl index and 
the market share variable into the empirical model. An undesirable 
result of inability to theoretically justify the specification of the 
empirical model is the potential for specification errors. 
Specification errors that can produce biased estimators in ordinary 
least squares analysis are a) incorrect specification of the disturbance 
term, b) nonlinear models incorrectly specified as linear models, and c) 
omission of relevant explanatory variables (Kmenta, 1971, Chapter 10). 
A review of previous bank performance studies reveals that the 
first two types of specification error are encountered infrequently. On 
the other hand, relevant explanatory variables are easily excluded from 
empirical models and detection of such errors is generally difficult. 
In this study, the coefficient on the market share variable could have 
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been biased by exclusion of a relevant explanatory variable since 
explicit measures of risk aversion were excluded from the empirical 
model. 
Recall from Chapter III that a management risk aversion variable 
was excluded from the empirical model because it was postulated that 
risk aversion is closely related to firm profitability, and therefore, 
management ability. If that postulate is incorrect, management risk 
aversion may be an excluded relevant explanatory variable, and exclusion 
of that variable could have biased the market share variable coefficient 
upward. Recalling that market shares were calculated using the total of 
time deposits, savings deposits, and demand deposits, it seems 
reasonable that less risk adverse bank managers would be willing to 
expand their bank's share of deposits by selling CDs which are 
relatively interest sensitive. Less risk adverse managers consequently 
would have higher market shares and higher ratios of time and savings 
deposits to total deposits. The existence of inverse relationships 
between risk aversion and market share, and risk aversion and the 
deposit ratio is a sufficient condition for a positively biased market 
share variable coefficient (see Kmenta, 1971, pp. 392-395). Whether the 
bias could be large enough to reverse the sign on the market share 
variable coefficient is an empirical question, the answer to which 
requires additional information about management risk aversion. 
Another type of bias that could affect the magnitude and sign of 
the market share variable coefficient is simultaneous equation bias. 
Osborne and Wendel (1983) proposed that market structure is influenced 
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by firm actions rather than vice versa indicating that market share 
should not be treated as an exogenous variable in empirical models. 
Results of multiple-stage least squares estimation, which are discussed 
in detail in the next section of this paper, do not indicate that the 
sign on the market share variable is affected by simultaneous equation 
bias. 
In summary, the unexpected sign on the market share variable does 
not appear to be the result of damaging linear dependencies among 
explanatory variables. Instead, the observed sign on the market share 
variable coefficient may be unique to the data set utilized in this 
study, or the coefficient itself may be biased due to specification 
error. It is also possible that the observed sign on the market share 
variable coefficient is correct but not theoretically verifiable since 
the dependent variable is a deposit ratio rather than a rate of return. 
Currently unanswered questions about the proper sign on the market share 
variable coefficient may be answered by increasing the number of 
observations in the data set or by collecting and utilizing information 
about management risk aversion. 
Impact of PCAs on bank performance Ordinary least squares 
estimation also raised questions about the consequences of statistical 
significance of PCA. binary variables and the proper method of 
incorporating information about PCAs into the empirical model. 
Additional analysis indicates that PCAs do influence the actions of 
agricultural banks, and information about the aggressiveness of 
individual PCAs should be incorporated into empirical models of 
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agricultural bank performance if such information is available. 
Based on t-statistics only, PCA binary variable coefficients were 
more likely to be statistically significant in deposit equations than 
loan equations. Those results weakly imply that PCA actions affect the 
liability side of balance sheets more strongly than the asset side. The 
reasons for those asymmetric results are unknown. One can only 
speculate that agricultural banks maintain loan volume in the face of 
PCA competition by manipulating the liability side of their balance 
sheets. It may be that banks attempt to lock in farm loan customers by 
increasing the returns on time and savings deposits relative to demand 
deposits, thus increasing the ratio of time and savings deposits to 
total deposits. On the other hand, agricultural banks may reduce the 
costs of demand deposits to their customers, thus decreasing the ratio 
of time and savings deposits to total deposits. The first explanation 
appears to be less plausible than the second because farm loan customers 
are not likely to maintain significant volumes of time and savings 
deposits. In any event, PCA binary variables provide only qualitative 
information, and very little can be inferred about the direction and 
strength of relationships between PCA actions and bank performance. To 
garner as much information as possible from available data, a number of 
variables were regressed on PCA binary variables only. 
The "ANOVA" results generally confirm results of ordinary least 
squares estimation (for a discussion of the similarities between 
regressions containing binary explanatory variables and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), see Kmenta, 1971, pp. 413-414). When the ratio of 
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loans to total assets was regressed on the 15 PCA binary variables, no 
coefficient was significantly different from zero in either year. The 
findings indicate that mean loan ratios did not vary significantly among 
PCA districts in 1976 and 1978. In contrast, three coefficients were 
significantly different from zero in 1976, and six coefficients were 
significantly different from zero in 1978 when the ratio of time and 
savings deposits to total deposits was regressed on PCA binary 
variables. Combined results show that mean deposit ratios did vary 
31 
significantly among some PCA districts while loan ratios did not. 
Differences in bank deposit ratios among PCA districts could be 
attributable to factors other than differences in PCA aggressiveness. 
Two obvious examples are bank size and bank management ability. If 
those factors are found to be related to differences in deposit ratios 
among PCA districts, then the proposed link between PCA aggressiveness 
and bank deposit ratios is weakened. Conversely, if there are no 
apparent relationships between firm size and differences in deposit 
ratios and between management ability and differences in deposit 
ratios, then the proposed link between PCA aggressiveness and bank 
deposit ratios is strengthened. 
ANOVA results indicate that there is little if any relationship 
between firm size and differences in deposit ratios or between 
management ability and differences in deposit ratios. When bank size 
31 Differences in deposit ratio regression results between 1976 and 
1978 most likely reflect the growing importance of PCAs as providers of 
short and intermediate term credit during the 1970s. 
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was regressed on PCA binary variables, only two coefficients were 
statistically significant. Furthermore, only one of those two was 
associated with a PCA district variable that was significant in the 
deposit equations. In other words, only one PCA district had both 
larger than average banks and higher than average deposit ratios. No 
PCA variable coefficient was statistically significant in either year 
when management ability was regressed on the 15 binary variables, 
implying that mean values of management ability do not vary 
significantly among PCA districts. Combined results support the notion 
that PCA actions affect deposit ratios at Iowa agricultural banks, but 
the evidence is indirect and a quantitative measure of PCA actions 
should be incorporated into future studies. 
Earlier analysis of ordinary least squares loan equations indicated 
that the explanatory power of the model was not sensitive to alternative 
specifications of PCA variables. Intercept terms were allowed to vary 
among PCA districts under the original specification whereas slope 
coefficients were allowed to vary among PCA districts under the 
alternative specification. The same procedure was applied to deposit 
equations, and representative statistics are shown in Table 8. 
A comparison of numbers in Tables 3 and 8 reveals that 
specification change bad a much greater impact on deposit equations than 
it did on loan equations. In 1976, the number of statistically 
significant PCA variables increased from four to five, but more 
importantly an F-statistic (Kmenta, 1971, p. 370) indicated that all PCA 
variables taken together were statistically significant at Che .01 
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Table 8. Comparison of original and alternative PCA specifications: 
ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits for 1976 
and 1978* 
Equation 
Variable 
Intercept 
Hf 
Sh 
Si 
.645*** 
(32.20) 
-.229*** 
(-3.61) 
.161*** 
(3.91) 
5.431 E-07 
(1.35) 
3.520 E-04 
(.93) 
.618*** 
(35.57) 
-.063 
(-.69) 
.158*** 
(3.85) 
4.599 E-07 
( 1 . 1 6 )  
3.344 E-04 
(.89) 
.679*** 
(36.47) 
-.228*** 
(-3.78) 
.132*** 
(3.42) 
4.478 E-07 
(1.49) 
7.257 E-04** 
(1.98) 
.653*** 
(39.81) 
-.053 
(-.60) 
.133*** 
(3.47) 
3.970 E-07 
(1.35) 
7.204 E-04** 
(2.01) 
8.77 4E-05*** 8.892 E-05*** 6.491 E-05*** 6.455 E-05*** 
(6.83) (7.04) (6.61) (6.67) 
*Hf and Sh calculated using banks and savings and loans in all 
equations. 
O^riginal specification, 1976. 
A^lternative specification, 1976. 
'^ Original specification, 1978, 
A^lternative specification, 1978. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
Table 8. (continued) 
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Variable 
Equation 
FR 
HC 
-.006 
(-.64) 
.019 
(.92) 
-.014 
(-.81) 
-.003 
(-.16) 
-.005 
(-.56) 
.018 
(.91) 
-.108 
(-1.13) 
4.134 E-04 
(.004) 
-.005 
( - .62)  
.011 
(.71) 
-.023 
(-1.43) 
- .011 
(-.76) 
-.004 
(-.49) 
.009 
(.58) 
-.155* 
( -1 .68)  
-.059 
(.64) 
-.034* 
(-1.73) 
-.009 
(-.39) 
-.193** 
(-2.27) 
-.102 
(-1.15) 
-.030 
(-1.63) 
-.007 
(-.30) 
-.195** 
(-2.37) 
-.106 
(-1.24) 
-.019 
(-.88) 
- .121 
(-1.09) 
-.014 
(-.71) 
-.104 
(-.98) 
-.022 
(-1.24) 
-.129 
(1.27) 
-.020 
(-1.21) 
-.128 
(-1.33) 
-.010 
(-.53) 
-.101 
(-1.08) 
—.006 
(-.37) 
-.086 
(-.94) 
10 
-.066*** 
(-3.70) 
-.035* 
(-1.94) 
.024 
(-1.12) 
—.440*** 
(-5.08) 
-.213** 
(-1.98) 
-.122 
(-1.39) 
-.058*** 
(-3.54) 
-.037** 
(-2.26) 
-.025 
(-1.25) 
-.426*** 
(-5.08) 
-.236** 
(-2.31) 
-.158* 
( -1 .81)  
D^i=PCA. in Equations (1) and (3); Di=PCA. x Hf in Equations (2) 
and (4). 1  ^
Table 8. (continued) 
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Equation 
Variable 
it 2^  34 4® 
1^1 -.038** (-2.13) 
-.209* 
(-1.95) 
—.03 8** 
(-2.29) 
-.215** 
(-2.08) 
°12 -.027 (-1.59) 
-.165 
(-1.47) 
-.032** 
(-1.99) 
-.198* 
(-1.87) 
°13 -.023 (-1.08) 
-.152 
(-1.05) 
-.015 
(-.76) 
-.095 
(-.69) 
°14 -.029 (-1.47) 
-.167* 
(-1.78) 
-.020 
(-1.09) 
-.120 
(-1.40) 
»15 -.023 (-1.33) 
-.097 
(-1.06) 
-.030* 
(-1.90) 
-.151* 
(-1.68) 
.2305 .2586 .2247 .2525 
125 
level. Even more remarkable is the fact that the Herfindahl index was 
statistically insignificant under the alternative specification but 
highly significant under the original specification. 
Results for 1978 are qualitatively similar to results for 1976. 
The number of statistically significant PCA variables increased from 
five to eight, and all PCA variables taken together added significant 
information to the model. The Herfindahl index was statistically 
significant at the .01 level under the original specification but 
statistically insignificant under the alternative specification. 
Recall, however, that the Herfindahl index coefficient represents 
different phenomena under the two alternatives. Coefficients on other 
explanatory variables were fairly stable between specifications in both 
years. 
Results in Tables 3 and 8 along with the "ANOVA" results described 
earlier indicate that PCAs should be accounted for in models of 
agricultural bank performance, but in order to achieve meaningful 
results, a statistically desirable measure of PCA activity must be used. 
In large scale studies which cover several states, PCA district binary 
variables are impractical because of their negative impact on degrees of 
freedom and because of the potential for damaging collinearity. A 
superior measure of PCA activity which likely reflects aggressiveness is 
growth of PCA loan volume. 
Tests of hypothesis 
On the basis of numbers in Tables 4 and 5, the hypothesis 
introduced in Chapter I cannot be rejected for either market structure 
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variable. When the management ability variable was included in the 
model, both market structure variables decreased in absolute value in 
all equations in both years. Magnitudes of change in 1976 Herfindahl 
index coefficients ranged from 22% (-.299 to -.232) to 29% (-.202 to -
.144), and magnitudes of change in 1976 market share variable 
coefficients ranged from 15% (.194 to .164) to 17% (.149 to .123). 
Magnitudes of change in 1978 Herfindahl index coefficients ranged from 
20% (-.284 to -.228) to 24% (-.194 to -.147), while magnitudes of change 
in 1978 market share variable coefficients ranged from 19% (.166 to 
.134) to 23% (.126 to .097). Market structure variables were 
significant at the .01 level in all equations. 
The overall results imply that the strength of the relationship 
between market structure and the time and savings deposit to total 
deposit ratio is overstated when information about management ability 
is excluded from the model. That finding is in contrast to loan 
equation results which implied that the relationship between market 
structure and the loan ratio was understated in the absence of the 
management ability variable. 
Although results from loan equations and deposit equations may 
appear to be inconsistent, they are not unexpected from a statistical 
point of view. When management ability is excluded from estimated 
equations, ordinary least squares estimators are biased. The direction 
of bias of individual coefficients is determined partly by the sign on 
the management ability variable when management ability is included in 
estimated equations and partly by signs on partial regression 
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coefficients produced by "regressing" management ability on other 
explanatory variables (see Kmenta, 1971, pp. 392-395). Since the 
management ability variable displays a negative sign in loan equations 
and a positive sign in deposit equations, it follows that the direction 
of bias of market structure variable coefficients will be different in 
the two equations. More important than the direction of bias, though, 
is the fact that market structure variables are highly significant in 
all deposit equations regardless of the presence or absence of the 
management ability variable. 
Multiple-Stage Least Squares 
Equations were estimated using multiple-stage least squares in 
order to determine the robustness of ordinary least squares estimates. 
If right hand side variables are not independent of disturbance terms, 
ordinary least squares estimators are biased. Three-stage least squares 
estimation was utilized in addition to two-stage least squares 
estimation because of the likelihood that disturbance terms are not 
independent across equations estimated with observations on individual 
firms. If disturbance terms are correlated across equations, two-stage 
least squares estimation does not utilize all available information in 
the model, and two-stage least squares estimates will differ from three-
stage least squares estimates. Note that multiple-stage equations were 
estimated with market structure variables that accounted for banks only 
because management ability variables could not be constructed for 
savings and loans and credit unions. 
Comparative statistics are displayed in Tables 9 and 10. Results 
Table 9. Comparison of OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS statistics: ratio of loans to assets for 1976 and 
1978 
Variable Equation 
1* 2^  3^  ^ 4d 5* 6f 
Intercept .532*** .539*** .547*** .592*** .604*** .605*** 
(16.79) (15.04) (15.36) (19.98) (18.12) (18.21) 
Hf -.049 -.107 -.149 -.143* -.194 -.200* 
(-.57) (-.84) (-1.17) (-1.82) (-1.63) (-1.69) 
Sh .062 .113 .109 .052 .058 .050 
(1.06) (1.10) (1.07) (.97) (.62) (.54) 
Si 2.430E-06*** 
(3.09) 
1.599E-03*** 
( 2 . 6 1 )  
2.098E-04 
(1.34) 
8.278E-07 
(.71) 
1.452E-03A* 
(2.40) 
3.866E-04** 
(3.03) 
-4.041E-05** -2.782E-05 
9.410E-07 
( .82)  
1.492E-03** 
(2.49) 
3.511E-04* 
(1.91) 
-2.914E-05 
1.832E-06*** 
(2.84) 
2.823E-03*** 
(4.85) 
1.222E-04 
(1.39) 
-2.768E-05* 
1.032E-06 
(.98) 
2.840E-03*** 
(4.86) 
1.962E-04* 
(1.67) 
-2.305E-05 
6.302E-07 
( .62)  
2.849E-03*** 
(4.90) 
2.350E-04** 
(2.08) 
-1.968E-05 
(-1.98) (-1.23) (-1.30) (-1.77) (-1.35) (-1.16) 
FR -.060*** -.055*** -.058*** —.048*** -.044*** -.044*** 
(-4.07) (-3.64) (-3.83) (-3.46) (-3.04) (-3.01) 
HC .029 .042 .032 .026 .035 .036 
(.88) (1.25) (.96) (1.05) (1.31) (1.35) 
PGA, .007 .010 .011 .005 .006 .007 
(.24) (.34) (.38) (.17) (.23) (.27) 
PCA„ .018 .019 .023 
 ^ (.72) (.74) (.91) 
PCA„ .016 .015 .022 
 ^ (.53) (.49) (.71) 
PCA, .051 .056 .067 
 ^ (1.32) (1.34) (1.62) 
PCA- .042 .040 .042 
 ^ (1.25) (1.17) (1.25) 
PCA- .003 5.867E-04 .006 
 ^ (.12) (.02) (.23) 
O^LS, 1976. 
^^ SLS, 1976. 
1976. 
®2SLS, 1978. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Signlfleant at .05 level. 
***SlgHlficant at .01 level. 
.012 
(.50) 
.021 
(.73) 
.037 
(1.03) 
.032 
(1.01) 
-.004 
( - . 1 6 )  
.011 
(.45) 
.024 
(.81) 
.049 
(1.25) 
.030 
(.94) 
-.005 
(-.19) 
.013 
(.55) 
.024 
( .82 )  
.045 
(1.15) 
.026 
(.84) 
-.001 
(-.04) 
Table 9. (continued) 
Equation 
Variable — — 
,a 2b 3= .4^  5® 6^  
PCAy .024 
(.82) 
.025 
(.83) 
.030 
(1.01) 
.042 
(1.50) 
.041 
(1.45) 
.042 
(1.51) 
PCAg .023 
(.84) 
.022 
(.78) 
.028 
(1.01) 
.035 
(1.33) 
.036 
(1.36) 
.037 
(1.42) 
PCAg -.024 
(-.87) 
-.027 
(-.95) 
-.023 
(-.81) 
-.011 
(-.43) 
-.014 
(-.51) 
-.010 
(-.40) 
PCA^ o .013 
(.40) 
.018 
(.53) 
.017 
(.48) 
.034 
(1.09) 
.041 
(1.28) 
.037 
(1.14) 
PCAii -.020 
(-.72) 
-.020 
(-.69) 
-.018 
(-.64) 
-.012 
(-.46) 
-.014 
(-.53) 
-.014 
(-.51) 
PCA,2 .009 
(.34) 
.007 
(.25) 
.010 
(.36) 
.007 
(.29) 
.005 
(.20) 
.008 
(.32) 
PCAJ3 -1.545E-04 
(-.005) 
-9.399E-04 
(-.03) 
-.002 
(-.05) 
-.005 
(-.16) 
-.007 
(-.21) 
-.008 
(-.24) 
PCAi4 .020 
(.65) 
.022 
(.69) 
.021 
(.67) 
.014 
(.48) 
.018 
(.59) 
.017 
(.55) 
PCAjS .022 
(.80) 
.020 
(.74) 
.024 
(.90) 
.016 
(.63) 
.014 
(.57) 
.016 
(.63) 
Table 10. Comparison of OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS statistics: ratio of time and savings deposits to 
total deposits for 1976 and 1978 
Variable Equation 
1* 2^  3^  ^ 4d 5® 6f 
Intercept .636*** 
(31.31) 
.628*** 
(27.29) 
.637*** 
(28.08) 
.672*** 
(35.73) 
.663*** 
(30.92) 
.670*** 
(31.77) 
Hf -.144*** 
(-2.64) 
-.136* 
(-1.67) 
-.170** 
(-2.13) 
-.147*** 
(-2.95) 
-.123 
(-1.61) 
-.145* 
(-1.95) 
Sh .123*** 
(3.30) 
.159** 
(2.43) 
.144** 
(2.25) 
.097*** 
(2.86) 
.124** 
(2.07) 
.106* 
(1.80) 
Si 5.309E-07 
(1.31) 
-7.008E-07 
(-1.37) 
-7.264E-07 
(-1.43) 
4.406E-07 
(1.46) 
-6.638E-07* 
(-1.76) 
-8.288E-07** 
(-2.22) 
R 2.979E-04 
(.78) 
2.414E-04 
(.62) 
2.39.0E-04 
(.63) 
6.479E-04* 
(1.76) 
5.725E-04 
(1.52) 
6.099E-04* 
(1.67) 
X 8.985E-05*** 
(6.95) 
1.036E-04*** 
(7.55) 
1.029E-04*** 
(7.53) 
6.611E-05*** 
(6.68) 
7.729E-05*** 
(7.36) 
7.839E-05*** 
(7.51) 
FR -.006 
(-.63) 
.002 
(.23) 
-7.941E-04 
(-.08) 
-.006 
(-.63) 
.004 
(.47) 
.002 
(.26) 
HC .021 
(1.04) 
.045** 
(2.10) 
.032 
(1.55) 
.012 
(.76) 
.034** 
(2.02) 
.025 
(1.55) 
PCA^  -.015 
(-.85) 
-.011 
(-.60) 
-.010 
(-.58) 
-.025 
(-1.51) 
-.021 
(-1.28) 
-.020 
(-1.19) 
PCAg 
PCA3 
PCA^  
PCA5 
PCA^  
- .001 
(- .08) 
-.036* 
(-1.85) 
-.015 
( - .60)  
- . 0 2 1  
(-.98) 
- . 0 2 1  
(-1.17) 
.003 
( .16)  
-.039* 
(-1.94) 
- .020 
(-.73) 
-.023 
(-1.04) 
- .020 
(-1.11) 
OLS, 1976. 
^*2518, 1976 
C3SLS, 1976. 
d'oLS, 1978 
®2SLS, 1978. 
^3SLS, 1978. 
*Significant at 
**Slgnifleant at 
***Signifleant at 
.10 level. 
.05 level. 
.01 level. 
.008 
(.48) 
-.032 
( - 1 . 6 1 )  
3.403E-04 
(.01) 
-.014 
( - .66)  
-.018 
(-1.04) 
-.011 
(-.74) 
-.033* 
(-1.79) 
- .012  
(-.51) 
-.017 
(-.84) 
- .020 
( - 1 . 2 1 )  
-.008 
(-.52) 
-.037* 
(-1.96) 
- .016 
(-.64) 
- .020 
(-.97) 
-.019 
(-1.11) 
- .001 
(-.09) 
-.030 
(-1.62) 
.001 
(.05) 
- .010 
(-.51) 
-.018 
(-1.09) 
Table 10. (continued) 
Equation 
Variable 
a 
1 2" 3^  ^
4d 5* 6f 
PCAy -.018 
(-.95) 
-.016 
(-.82) 
-.012 
(-.63) 
-.013 
(-.75) 
-.011 
(-.64) 
-.007 
(-.42) 
PCAg —.066*** 
(-3.71) 
—,067*** 
(-3.79) 
-.062*** 
(-3.52) 
-.059*** 
(-3.57) 
-.061*** 
(-3.64) 
-.057*** 
(-3.47) 
PCAg -.034* 
(-1.88) 
-.032* 
(-1.77) 
-.032* 
(-1.77) 
-.038** 
(-2.27) 
—,036** 
(-2.13) 
-.036** 
(-2.15) 
PCAjo -.027 
(-1.24) 
-.026 
(-1.18) 
-.023 
(-1.06) 
-.025 
(-1.24) 
-.023 
(-1.13) 
-.021 
(-1.05) 
PCA^ i -.038** 
(-2.10) 
-.033* 
(-1.79) 
-.034* 
(-1.88) 
-.038** 
(-2.27) 
-.032* 
(-1.89) 
-.032* 
(-1.93) 
PCA,2 -.025 
(-1.45) 
-.023 
(-1.28) 
-.023 
(-1.35) 
-.030* 
(-1.87) 
-.027* 
(-1.66) 
-.027* 
(-1.71) 
PCAJ3 -.021 
(-.96) 
-.032 
(-1.59) 
-.020 
(-.90) 
-.030 
(-1.48) 
-.020 
(-.94) 
-.031 
(-1.56) 
-.014 
(-.68) 
-.025 
(-1.32) 
-.012 
(-.59) 
-.024 
(-1.22) 
-.013 
(-.65) 
-.023 
(-1.24) 
PCA^ S -.023 
(-1.32) 
-.024 
(-1.39) 
-.022 
(-1.37) 
-.030* 
(-1.86) 
-.032** 
(-1.98) 
-.030* 
(-1.89) 
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from loan equations are shown in Table 9, and results from deposit 
equations are shown in Table 10. Observed variation of coefficients 
between ordinary least squares equations and two-stage least squares 
equations indicates that right hand side endogenous variables (Hf, Sh, 
and Si) were not perfectly predicted in the first stage of two-stage 
least squares estimation. If exogenous variables were capable of 
perfectly predicting values of endogenous variables, ordinary least 
squares estimates would be equivalent to two-stage least squares 
estimates. Observed variation between two-stage least squares estimates 
and three-stage least squares estimates indicates that disturbance terms 
were not independent across equations. 
In the loan equation, variables that appear to be most sensitive to 
changes in estimation procedures are the firm size variable (Si), the 
government deposit variable (G), and the management ability variable 
(X). This result is not surprising since earlier analysis revealed 
fairly strong correlations between firm size and government deposits 
(.69 in 1976 and .73 in 1978) and firm size and management ability (.33 
in 1976 and .29 in 1978). The government deposit variable appears to 
pick up information about the firm size variable and the management 
ability variable in multiple-stage estimations, possibly because of 
variable interaction. 
Coefficients on other variables, with the exception of the market 
structure variables, tend to be fairly stable across estimation methods. 
Market structure variable coefficients may vary because they are 
endogenous variables subject to simultaneous equation bias in ordinary 
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least squares estimations. 
Variables of obvious importance in the loan equation are the market 
structure variables and the management ability variable. Although 
coefficients on market structure variables differed somewhat across 
estimation methods, statistical significance did not vary greatly. 
Overall, multiple-stage least squares results do not justify altering 
previous conclusions about the impact of market structure on loan 
ratios. The management ability variable declined in significance in 
multiple-stage equations but the decline was not precipitous since the 
variable was not highly significant in ordinary least squares equations. 
The weak relationship between management ability and loan ratios may be 
indicative of a deposit customer relationship wherein loan requests are 
satisfied whenever possible in order to retain customer deposits. It is 
also possible that risk aversion, an excluded variable, plays a dominant 
role in the determination of loan ratios. 
In the deposit equation (Table 10), variables that appear to be 
most sensitive to changes in estimation procedures are the firm size 
variable - particularly in 1978, the market structure variables, and the 
holding company affiliation variable. The sign on the firm size 
variable coefficient is reversed in multiple-stage least squares 
estimations, and the variable is statistically significant in 1978. 
This result is unexpected and reasons for its existence are not known. 
A speculative reason for the existence of the unexpected sign is that 
the size variable interacts strongly with some related variable in 
multiple-stage estimations. 
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Table 10 reveals that levels of statistical significance of market 
structure variables are generally lower in multiple-stage estimations. 
Those results are consistent with White's (1984) conclusion that levels 
of significance of structure variables are too high in ordinary least 
squares estimations of bank profitability equations. The reduced 
importance of market structure variables in multiple-stage estimations 
may indicate that ordinary least squares estimates suffer from 
simultaneous bias, or it may simply reflect the fact that market 
structure variables were predicted poorly by exogenous variables in the 
first stage of multiple-stage estimations. 
"Goodness of fit" of alternative estimation methods is difficult to 
determine without knowledge of the true parameters of the model. 
Coefficients of determination associated with loan and deposit equations 
are smaller in two-stage least squares estimations than in ordinary 
least squares estimations, but coefficients of determination are 
imperfect measures of "goodness of fit." Evidence concerning the 
possibility that structure variables were predicted poorly in first-
stage estimations is indeterminate. First-stage statistics show that 
the coefficient of determination associated with the Herfindahl index 
equation was approximately .65 in both years, and the coefficient of 
determination associated with the market share variable equation was 
approximately .50 in both years. 
The holding company affiliation variable was found to be 
statistically significant in two—stage least squares estimation but not 
significant in ordinary least squares or three-stage least squares 
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estimations. It is possible that the variability of results for the 
holding company variable is related to the unexpected sign on the size 
variable since holding company affiliates tend to be larger agricultural 
banks. 
To summarize briefly, results concerning key variables in the 
deposit equation - management ability and market structure - were mixed. 
Numbers indicated that ordinary least squares analysis overstated the 
statistical significance of market structure variables, but "goodness of 
fit" of multiple-stage estimations was indeterminate. Questions about 
the exogeneity of market structure variables, therefore, remain 
unanswered. Results pertaining to the management ability variable, on 
the other hand, were unambiguous. The management ability variable was 
found to be statistically significant at the .01 level under all three 
estimation methods in both years. 
Additional equations were estimated in which market structure 
variables and the firm size variable were treated as left hand side 
variables. Results are shown in Tables 11 through 13. 
Table 11 exhibits results from the Herfindahl index equation. 
Figures show that the number of banking institutions in the market (I^ ) 
was not a significant determinant of the Herfindahl index, while the 
number of communities with banks (U„) was significant at the .01 level 
M. 
in all equations. The latter variable exhibited an expected negative 
sign. The number of banking institutions per community 
statistically significant only in the two-stage least squares equations, 
but the coefficient had an expected negative sign in all equations. 
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Table 11. Multiple-stage least squares statistics: Herfindahl index 
Variable Equation 
Intercept 
U, 
M 
V"m 
V, 
.571*** .459*** .548*** .447*** 
(11.25) (10.89) (10.77) (10.58) 
.004 -.004 -1.245E-04 -.008 
(.58) (-.81) (-.02) (-1.51) 
-.038*** -.027*** -.033*** -.021*** 
(-4.26) (-3.66) (-3.57) (-2.85) 
-.118*** -.036 -.101*** -.027 
(-3.22) (-1.18) (-2.75) (-.88) 
034E-08* -7.075E-08 -8.549E-08** -7.423E-08* 
(-1.68) (-1.33) (-2.07) (-1.83) 
2SLS, 1976. 
^3SLS, 1976. 
^2SLS, 1978. 
^3SLS, 1978. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
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Table 12. Multiple-stage least squares statistics: market share 
Variable 
1^  2^  3^  4^  ^
Intercept .168*** 
(3.89) 
.116*** 
(3.18) 
.148*** 
(3.49) 
.100*** 
(2.80) 
-.022*** 
(-4.35) 
-.017*** 
(-4.19) 
-.020*** 
(-4.07) 
-.016*** 
(-4.00) 
.102*** 
(3.74) 
.131*** 
(5.88) 
. 114*** 
(4.28) 
.137*** 
(6.26) 
Vc -.002 (-.56) 
-.004 
(-1.65) 
-.003 
(-.82) 
-.005* 
(-1.82) 
X 3.940E-05** 
(2.35) 
4.537E-05*** 
(3.39) 
2.968E-05** 
(2.12) 
3.727E-05*** 
(3.33) 
-1.155E-07 
(-1.36) 
-1.032E-07 
(-1.23) 
-7.232E-08 
(-1.15) 
-5.264E-08 
(-.85) 
2SLS, 1976. 
b 3SLS, 1976. 
C2SLS, 1978. 
d 3SLS, 1978. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
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Table 13. Multiple-stage least squares statistics; firm size 
Variable Equation 
1* 2^  3= 4^  
Intercept 86.147 152.075 99.45 240.548 
(.07) (.13) (.06) (.16) 
Pc 2.286*** 2.282*** 2.757*** 2.726*** 
-(25.73) (26.09) (24.03) (24.18) 
PD -2.439 -5.618 -1.405 -5.042 
(-.17) (-.39) (-.07) (-.27) 
ic/Pc -442885*** -450397*** -506547*** -541168*** 
(-3.86) (-4.04) (-3.59) (-3.96) 
X 9.715*** 9.781*** 9.361*** 9.453*** 
(10.38) (10.49) (9.30) (9.43) 
*2SLS, 1976. 
3^SLS, 1976. 
2^SLS, 1978. 
*^ 3SLS, 1978. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
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Insignificance of the institutions per community variable in three-stage 
least squares equations apparently was a result of correlated 
disturbance terms. Three-stage least squares statistics show that the 
correlation between disturbance terms of the Herfindahl index equation 
and disturbance terms of the market share equation was equal to .60. 
Variability (variance) of management ability (V^ ) was statistically 
significant in three equations, but in none of those equations was the 
variable highly significant. In addition, the sign on the variable 
coefficient was unexpectedly negative. It was posited in Chapter III 
that larger variations in management ability would be associated with 
higher Herfindahl indices mainly because of greater variations in firm 
size. It is possible, however, that the variance of management ability 
is inversely related to the Herfindahl index because variance of 
management ability rises with the number of banking institutions in the 
market. This notion is weakly supported by numbers from the simple 
correlation matrix. The correlation between variance of management 
ability and number of institutions in the market was approxiniately .15 
in 1978 but only .04 in 1976. Note, though, that variance of management 
ability was statistically significant only at the .10 level in the 1976 
two-stage least squares equation and not significant in the 1976 three-
stage least squares equation. 
Table 12 displays results from the market share equation. 
Significant determinants of market share are the number of banking 
number of institutions in the city 
(Ig), and management ability (X). Interaction between number of 
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firms in the market and number of firms in the city (1^ 1^ ) and variance 
of management ability (V^ ) were not found to be statistically 
significant variables. The number of banking institutions in the market 
and management ability displayed anticipated signs, while the number of 
institutions in the bank's city exhibited an unexpected positive sign. 
In retrospect, as the number of institutions in a city rises, firms tend 
to increase in size and control larger shares of markets as delineated 
(correlation between the number of institutions in the city and market 
share was approximately .30). 
Results from the firm size equation are shown in Table 13. 
Significant explanatory variables are city population (P^ ), the number 
of banking institutions per capita in the city and management 
ability (X). County population density (PD) was statistically 
insignificant in all equations. City population and management ability 
exhibited expected positive signs, but the institutions per capita 
variable exhibited an unanticipated negative sign. The simple 
correlation matrix indicates that the relationship between city 
population and firm size is much stronger than the relationship between 
number of institutions in the city and firm size, hence, changes in city 
population dominate changes in number of institutions in the 
institutions per capita variable. An increase in city population will 
generally be associated with a decrease in the institutions per capita 
variable. 
In summary, it is noteworthy that signs on the management ability 
variable are consistent and theoretically correct in multiple-stage 
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least squares estimations. Overall results indicate that assets per 
employee is a reasonable measure of management ability at agricultural 
banks. In addition, multiple-stage least squares estimation failed to 
provide convincing evidence that ordinary least squares results suffer 
froa simultaneous equation bias. Empirical results do indicate weakly, 
however, that the statistical significance of market structure variables 
might have been overstated in ordinary least squares estimations of the 
deposit equation. 
Structural Shift 
The final statistical analysis in this paper addresses the issue of 
the appropriateness of popular banking market delineation methods. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on the possibility that the Herfindahl 
index, or any other measure of market concentration that is based upon a 
geographically delineated banking market, may not be a satisfactory 
measure of market structure when individual firms are involved. 
The Chow test (Chow, 1960) determines if two samples could have 
come from a common population by comparing estimated regression 
coefficients between samples. The test should also be useful for 
testing the adequacy of market structure variables. To determine if the 
Herfindahl index and the market share variable are adequate measures of 
market structure across Iowa banking markets, Iowa agricultural banks 
were divided into two groups, and regression coefficients for the two 
groups were subjected to the Chow test. The two groups of banks 
consisted of a) banks from single bank towns and b) banks from multiple 
bank towns. Loan equations and deposit equations as specified in 
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Chapter III were estimated for both groups. 
The test statistic utilized was of the form: 
{SSE - (SSE^  + SSE2)}/k 
^ " (SSE^ + SSE^) / (Uj + *2 - 2k) 
where SSE = the error sum of squares for all banks combined, 
SSEj = the error sum of squares for banks from single bank 
towns, 
SSEg = the error sum of squares for banks from multiple bank 
towns, 
k = the number of explanatory variables in estimated 
equations, 
n^  = the number of banks from single bank towns, 
n^  = the number of banks from multiple bank towns. 
If the hypothesis that the two samples came from the same population is 
true, the test statistic is F-distributed with k and n^ +n^ -Zk degrees of 
freedom. 
Error sums of squares (SSE) and ^ -statistics from the Chow test are 
shown in Table 14. Tabulated F-statistics associated with loan 
equations are small indicating that banks from single bank towns and 
banks from multiple bank towns were drawn from the same population. 
However, F-statistics associated with deposit equations are close to 
being significant at the .05 level, weakly indicating that the two 
groups of banks came from different populations. 
The Chow test does not identify which coefficients are 
significantly different between equations, but empirical results 
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Table 14. Error sums of squares and F-statistics from Chow test 
Equation S SE 
All banks Single banks Multiple banks 
1976 
Loan^  5.645 3.602 1.914 .386 
Deposit^  2.294 1.648 .453 1.590 
1978 
Loan*^  4.932 3.348 1.489 .324 
Deposit^  1.966 1.394 .402 1.638 
n^^  = 291, n^  = 153, k = 24. 
= 291, n^  = 153, k = 23. 
= 287, ng = 157, k = 24. 
= 287, 0.2 = 157, k = 23. 
146 
provide strong evidence that market structure variables differ 
between groups of banks. In both deposit equations estimated with banks 
from single bank communities, the Qerfindahl index and the market share 
variable were statistically significant at the .01 level. Conversely, 
the same variables were statistically insignificant in both equations 
32 
estimated with banks from multiple bank communities. Market structure 
variables were not statistically significant in the aggregate loan 
equation, therefore it is not surprising that estimated coefficients did 
not differ significantly between group loan equations. If market 
structure variables are responsible for the structural shift observed in 
the deposit equation, and if market structure variables do not 
significantly influence loan ratios, then loan equations should not be 
affected by structural shift. 
Evidence indicates that the Herfindahl index and the market share 
variable may be deficient measures of market structure when both single 
bank communities and multiple bank communities exist within a single 
banking market. A possible solution to the problem of deficient market 
structure variables would be estimation of separate equations for 
institutions from single bank communities and institutions from multiple 
bank communities. That solution is undesirable, however, because it 
would fail to take advantage of all information available in the 
32 Probabilities of a greater t-statistic for the Herfindahl index 
were .59 in 1976 and .82 in 1978. Probabilities of a greater t-
statistic for the market share variable were .55 in 1976 and .27 in 
1978. 
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aggregated data set. An alternative solution would be development of a 
market structure variable that is based on the individual firm rather 
than geographical markets. Such a variable might resemble the 
concentration gradient proposed by Osborne and Wendel (1983, p. 20). 
Regardless of its form, the structure variable must be capable of 
measuring competitive affects within single bank communities and 
multiple bank communities simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study attempted to measure the impact of management ability 
and market structure on agricultural bank performance in Iowa. Although 
some issues remain unresolved, and several new questions were raised, a 
number of pertinent pieces of information arose from the study. 
Empirical results imply that agricultural banks will not be immune to 
the market restructuring effects of financial deregulation, but findings 
also indicate that agricultural banks are not at the mercy of 
uncontrolled market factors since management ability plays a key role in 
bank performance. 
Summary of Empirical Results 
A legitimate criticism of past structure-performance studies that 
were based on observations of individual firms is that the performance 
of individual banks is likely to be uniquely influenced by managerial 
preference and market share (Rhoades, 1982). In response to that 
criticism, this study included a theoretically derived measure of 
management ability (ratio of assets to employees) and a measure of 
market share along with other control variables that typically appear in 
structure-performance studies. In addition, binary variables were 
included to account for the impact of PCAs on the performance of 
agricultural banks. 
Ordinary least squares estimation revealed the following about Iowa 
agricultural banks: a) market structure, measured by the Herfindahl 
index and market share, significantly affected the ratio of time and 
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savings deposits to total deposits but did not significantly affect the 
ratio of loans to total assets, b) management ability significantly 
impacted both the ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of time 
and savings deposits to total deposits, but the effect on the latter 
ratio was much stronger, c) incorporation of information about thrift 
institutions into market structure variables did not appear to strengthen 
the measured relationship between market structure and agricultural bank 
performance, and d) the ratio of time and savings deposits to total 
deposits at agricultural banks differed significantly among some PCA 
districts while the ratio of loans to total assets generally did not. 
Empirical results indicated that an increase of .10 in the 
Herfindahl index resulted in a decrease of approximately .01 to .02 in 
the ratio of loans to total assets and a decrease of approximately .02 
in the ratio of time and savings deposits to total deposits. An 
increase of .10 in the market share variable was associated with an 
increase of approximately .01 in the ratio of loans to total assets and 
an increase of approximately .01 to .02 in the ratio of time and savings 
deposits to total deposits. Furthermore, if management ability (ratio 
of assets to employees) increased by one million dollars, the ratio of 
loans to total assets increased by approximately .09 in 1976 and 
approximately .06 to .07 in 1978, and the ratio of time and savings 
deposits to total deposits decreased by approximately .04 in 1976 and 
approximately .03 in 1978. Magnitudes of relationships differed 
slightly between years because dollar volumes were not adjusted for 
inflation. 
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Combined results pertaining to market structure have two important 
implications for Iowa agricultural banks. First, changes in banking 
regulations that alter the structure of banking markets will affect the 
balance sheets and performance of agricultural banks. Branching by de 
novo entry unquestionably alters the structure of banking markets, 
therefore, liberalized branching laws that promote de novo entry will 
impact the performance of agricultural banks. Conclusions regarding the 
effects of branching by merger are beyond the scope of this study, 
however, because branching by merger does not necessarily change the 
structure of local banking markets. Quantification of the effects of 
branching by merger may require flow of funds analysis. 
Second, because agricultural banks apparently were not influenced 
by the presence of thrift institutions prior to passage of the MCA, they 
will have to contend with a new group of competitors as financial 
deregulation occurs. Unfortunately for agricultural banks, new 
competition from thrifts is likely to impact the liability side of the 
balance sheet which is already sensitive to competitive pressures from 
other commercial banks. 
Results pertaining to management ability offer some consolation to 
agricultural bankers. Those results indicate that management ability is 
a key determinant of bank balance sheet ratios and performance when such 
factors as market structure and firm size are held constant. Knowledge 
of the potential impact of management ability on bank performance should 
induce agricultural bankers to investigate methods of enhancing 
management ability. A key question concerns the degree to which 
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management ability can be altered by training, education, and 
experience. If superior management is innate and cannot be acquired, 
bank owners and directors must be willing to pay higher salaries to 
obtain the services of more able managers. If management ability can be 
enhanced by education or training, bank owners and directors may choose 
to expend funds for those purposes. Finally, if experience improves 
management ability, bank owners and directors may be required to hire 
more experienced managers away from other firms. This study analyzed 
management ability within a static framework, therefore it did not 
reveal how management ability can be improved. The human capital 
literature may provide such information. 
Statistical significance of PCA. binary variables in the deposit 
ratio equation provides weak evidence that PCAs affect Iowa 
agricultural bank performance. That evidence is fortified somewhat by 
statistical analysis which indicates that differences in bank deposit 
ratios among PCA districts are not related to bank management ability or 
bank size. The relationship between PCAs and agricultural bank 
performance may be even stronger than indicated by this study, but PCA 
binary variables can provide only limited amounts of information. More 
definitive information will likely require replacing qualitative 
variables with a quantitative variable such as growth of PCA loan 
volume. 
One controversial outcome of ordinary least squares analysis was 
the positive sign exhibited by the market share variable in both the 
loan ratio equation and the deposit ratio equation. Combined results 
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of earlier studies (Ford, 1974; Ford and Olson, 1976, 1978; Olson, 
1975; Rhoades, 1984) indicate, albeit indirectly, that higher market 
shares should be associated with lower loan ratios and lower deposit 
ratios. Although a specific reason for the unexpected sign on the 
market share variable was not determined empirically, a test for 
collinearity indicated it was not a result of damaging linear 
dependencies among explanatory variables. 
Possible reasons for the appearance of the unexpected sign are: a) 
the empirical results are unique to the data set utilized, b) the 
expectation that market share is inversely related to the loan and 
deposit ratios is unfounded, or c) the coefficient on the market share 
variable is biased due to specification error. The first potential 
explanation could be analyzed by expanding the data set to include 
agricultural banks from several states. The second explanation could be 
analyzed by expanding the data set, or more appropriately, by further 
exploring the theoretical relationship between market share and bank 
performance (see the Appendix in Rhoades (1984) for a rudimentary 
theoretical link between market share and market power). The final 
possible explanation reflects the notion that management risk aversion 
may be an excluded relevant explanatory variable. To test that notion, 
a measure of management risk aversion, preferably a measure elicited 
directly from bank management, would be included in the empirical model 
as an explanatory variable. If the first explanation was proved to be 
correct empirically, analysis of the other two explanations would be less 
critical but not less interesting. 
153 
Hypothesis tests associated with ordinary least squares estimation 
indicated that coefficients on market structure variables were 
understated in loan equations and overstated in deposit equations when 
the management ability variable was excluded from the empirical model. 
Those results are consistent with Kmenta's (1971) discussion of excluded 
relevant explanatory variables providing further support for the 
postulate that management ability is a key determinant of bank 
performance. 
Multiple-stage least squares analysis was performed to test the 
robustness of ordinary least squares estimates. Of particular interest 
were estimated coefficients on market structure variables given the 
disputed exogeneity of those variables (see, for example, Rhoades (1984) 
and Osborne and Wendel (1983)). Statistical results showed that 
coefficients on market structure variables were sensitive to method of 
estimation, but there was no conclusive evidence that ordinary least 
squares estimates suffered from simultaneous equation bias. Despite the 
indeterminacy of exogeneity of market structure variables, future 
studies of bank performance should be of the multiple equation variety 
since those types of models are most consistent with the simultaneous 
nature of bank management decision-making. 
Finally, a test for structural shift indicated that market structure 
variables which are based on a geographically delineated market may not 
be sufficient when institutions from single bank communities and 
institutions from multiple bank communities are included in the same 
sample. Empirical results implied that interaction among firms in 
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multiple bank communities was ignored when traditional measures of 
market structure were used with mixed samples « A measure of market 
concentration that accounts more fully for the spatial nature of banking 
markets may be necessary for successful analysis of agricultural bank 
performance in the future. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Future research pertaining to the performance of agricultural banks 
should be based upon more complete and explicit theoretical models of 
bank behavior. Development of more complete and explicit theoretical 
models is admittedly an unenviable task given the complexity of bank 
management decision-making, but such models would add credibility to 
subsequently derived empirical models. 
Theoretical models could be made more explicit and complete by a) 
incorporating Oi's (1983) theoretical model of management ability into a 
technical relationship that accounts for the costs of various bank 
services including services associated with financial assets and 
liabilities, b) fully incorporating information about management risk-
return utility functions into the objective function, c) further 
developing theoretical relationships among market structure, market 
share, and the bank management decision—making process, and d) further 
developing mathematical representations of bank liquidity management. 
All four areas of research could be developed independently of one 
another, and in some cases a solid body of research already exists. 
Mathematical specification of technical relationships that account for 
the ability of bank management could be based on past cost and economy 
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of scale studies in banking. Utility maximization models could be based 
on, or related to, Ratti's (1979a) theoretical model of the banking firm 
which accounts for differing levels of risk aversion. Mathematical 
formulations of the bank liquidity relationship could be based on models 
presented by Baltensperger (1980) and Spellman (1982). The most 
challenging task appears to be development of a theoretical model that 
explicitly links bank management decision-making to market structure. 
Economic theory currently cannot explain the conduct of individual firms 
when more than two firms compete imperfectly because interaction among 
parameters of supply and demand functions of multiple firms cannot be 
specified mathematically. 
Suggestions for improved theoretical models lead logically to 
suggestions for improved empirical models. Due to the simultaneous 
nature of bank management decision-making, empirical models should 
consist of multiple equations (see Brown (1983) for a similar suggestion 
pertaining to bank holding company performance studies). In addition, 
complete and useful empirical models should include as endogenous 
variables all variables that were treated as choice variables in the 
theoretical model. Ability to construct empirical models that resemble 
theoretical models depends, of course, on the availability of 
appropriately measured variables. 
A final suggestion concerns empirical verification of the ratio of 
assets to employees as a measure of management ability. If the ratio of 
assets to employees does indeed reflect management ability, it should be 
related to certain socio-economic characteristics of management such as 
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schooling, experience, salary and so on. To determine which 
characteristics of management explain management ability, the ratio of 
assets to employees could be regressed on selected characteristics of 
management, or a similar set of variables could be subjected to 
principal components analysis. Past human capital studies may provide 
clues as to which variables should be included in an analysis of 
management ability. Empirical results may not be invariant to 
specification of management, however, and researchers must determine 
which of the bank's officers — or directors — most strongly influences 
bank performance. 
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APPENDIX: DELINEATION OF IOWA BANKING MARKETS 
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